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This dissertation addresses the main challenges faced in the transition to a more sustain-
able energy sector by applying modelling tools that could design more eective manage-
rial responses and provide policy insights. To mitigate the impact of climate change, the
electric power industry needs to reduce markedly its emissions of greenhouse gases. As
energy consumption is set to increase in the foreseeable future, this can be achieved only
through costly investments in more ecient conventional generation or in renewable en-
ergy resources. While more energy-ecient technologies are commercially available, the
deregulation of most electricity industries implies that investment decisions need to be
taken by private investors with government involvement limited to setting policy mea-
sures or designing market rules. Thus, it is desirable to understand how investment and
operational decisions are to be made by decentralised entities that face uncertainty and
competition.
One of the most ecient thermal power technologies is cogeneration, or combined heat
and power (CHP), which can recover heat that otherwise would be discarded from con-
ventional generation. Cogeneration is particularly ecient when the recovered heat can
be used in the vicinity of the combustion engine. Although governments are supporting
on-site CHP generation through feed-in taris and favourable grid access, the adoption
of small-scale electricity generation has been hindered by uncertain electricity and gas
prices. While deterministic and real options studies have revealed distributed generation
to be both economical and eective at reducing CO2 emissions, these analyses have not
addressed the aspect of risk management. In order to overcome the barriers of nancial
uncertainties to investment, it is imperative to address the decision-making problems of
a risk-averse energy consumer. Towards that end, we develop a multi-stage, stochastic
mean-risk optimisation model for the long-term and medium-term risk management prob-
lems of a large consumer. We rst show that installing a CHP unit not only results in
both lower CO2 emissions and expected running cost but also leads to lower risk exposure.
In essence, by investing in a CHP unit, a large consumer obtains the option to use on-site
generation whenever the electricity price peaks, thereby reducing signicantly its nancial
risk over the investment period. To provide further insights into risk management strate-
gies with on-site generation, we examine also the medium-term operational problem of a
large consumer. In this model, we include all available contracts from electricity and gas
futures markets, and analyse their interactions with on-site generation. We conclude that
by swapping the volatile electricity spot price for the less volatile gas spot price, on-site
generation with CHP can lead to lower risk exposure even in the medium term, and it
alters a risk-averse consumer's demand for futures contracts.
While extensive subsidies have triggered investments in renewable generation, theseinstallations need to be accompanied by transmission expansion. The reason for this is
that solar and wind energy output is intermittent, and attractive solar and wind sites are
often located far away from demand centres. Thus, to integrate renewable generation into
the grid system and to maintain a reliable and secure electricity supply, a vastly improved
transmission network is crucial. Finding the optimal transmission line investments for
a given network is already a very complex task since these decisions need to take into
account future demand and generation congurations, too, which now depend on private
investors. To address these concerns, our third study models the problem of wind energy
investment and transmission expansion jointly through a stochastic bi-level programming
model under dierent market designs for transmission line investment. This enables the
game-theoretic interaction between distinct decision makers, i.e., those investing in power
plants and those constructing transmission lines, to be addressed directly. We nd that
under perfect competition only one of the wind power producers, the one with lower cap-
ital cost, makes investment and to a lower degree under a prot-maximising merchant
investor (MI) than under a welfare-maximising transmission system operator (TSO), as
the MI reduces the transmission capacity to increase congestion rent. In addition, we
note that regardless of whether the grid expansion is carried out by the TSO or by the
MI, a higher proportion of wind energy is installed when power producers exercise market
power. In eect, strategic withholding of generation capacity by producers prompts more
transmission investment since the TSO aims to increase welfare by subsidising wind and
the MI creates more ow to maximise prot. Under perfect competition, a higher level of
wind generation can be achieved only through mandating renewable portfolio standards
(RPS), which in turn results also in increased transmission investment.Contents
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viiiChapter 1
Introduction
Energy has been at the centre of economic development since the beginning of the Indus-
trial Revolution: for example, coal and oil have had long-established markets and have
played an important role in international trade. Not only did coal facilitate the advance-
ment of rail transport, but also coal trac itself has been a major source of income of
the railway industry ever since (Solomon and Yough, 2009). Today, crude oil is the most
widely traded commodity in the world, accounting for over 30% of international shipping
(Ji and Fan, 2013). Electricity began to be sold publicly not long after the establishment
of the rst oil reneries and has soon become inseparable from modernity. As a result
of increasing electrication of services, electricity improves more and more aspects of life.
Indeed, the electric power industry is one of the world's largest industries (Morton, 2002).
However, unlike coal and oil, electricity is still provided only by government owned utili-
ties in large parts of the world, and the establishment of competitive wholesale electricity
markets is a very recent development.
In the late 19th century, the rst power plants were nanced completely by private
capital. Electricity was supplied through direct current and was used locally, providing
street and home lighting. Over the course of time, with the advancement of the ap-
plications of alternating current, electricity could be transported over longer distances,
thereby triggering the establishment of utility companies. Since building large transmis-
sion networks required huge initial investments and power generation exhibited signicant
economies of scale, the electricity industry was regarded as an ideal example of a natural
monopoly. In fact, after the Second World War, electricity systems were nationalised in
most OECD countries (Millward, 2005). All functions of the electricity supply chain, i.e.,
generation, transmission, and distribution, were merged into state-owned utility compa-
nies (Finon and Midttun, 2004). These vertically integrated companies built their own
power plants and coordinated generation investments with the planning of transmission
expansion. In real time, system operators controlled electricity generation by deciding
which power plants should operate and which ones need to shut down in order not to
overload the transmission network (Hunt, 2002). Since customers paid a single tari, set
1by the regulatory authority, for the electricity, unlike in a deregulated industry, the genera-
tors received no price signal for ecient operation (Fig. 1.1). This led to highly politicised
pricing and investment decisions, where risk management or protability played little to
no role.
However, the energy crisis of the 1970s exposed the ineciencies within the genera-
tion and distribution sectors along with their vulnerability to oil imports (Gibbons and
Blair, 1991). Even so, the subsequent years were still marked by strong state control of
all energy industries, but this time with a greater focus on new technologies and diversi-
cation of the energy mix. In the 1980s, economic policies shifted towards liberalisation,
i.e., erasing trade barriers, privatising monopolies, reducing government regulations, and
opening up industries to full competition (Rubsamen, 1989). In the electric power indus-
try, where physical constraints precluded full liberalisation, the focus was on deregulating
the generation sector end which displayed the most striking ineciencies, i.e., poor choice
of technology, lack of innovation, cost overruns in construction and maintenance, and
diculties in pricing (Joskow, 2000). Also, the political risks of purchasing cheap natural
gas from the former Soviet Union were reduced with the end of the Cold War (Helm,
2009). Consequently, the 1990s saw the introduction of several directives from the Euro-
pean Union (EU) with the aim of reducing the barriers to cross-border trade of electricity
(Jamasb and Pollit, 2005). In particular, the EU Electricity Market Directives of 1996
and 2003 focused on unbundling the industry and a gradual opening of national markets.
The 2003 directive further promoted competition by tightening the regulation of access
to networks and enforcing the use of independent regulators. These measures led to re-
structured electricity industries with increased competition in wholesale generation and
retail supply, intensive regulation of distribution networks, and privatisation of regional
utility companies (Jamasb, 2002), which, consequently, led to the emergence of modern
electricity markets.
2(a) Regulated Electricity Industry (b) Deregulated Electricity Industry
Figure 1.1: Money Flows in the Electricity Industry Before and After Deregulation
However, deregulation and liberalisation have not achieved all of the desired outcomes.
The failings of deregulation have resulted in complicated market designs, which, in turn,
have led to market power abuse and inecient investments (Woo et al., 2006). Analysing
the eects of deregulation of electricity industries, Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) found that
the unbundling of generation from transmission and introduction of a wholesale spot mar-
ket did not necessarily lower prices and might possibly have resulted in higher prices for
residential customers. For example, between 1993 and 2000, gas and coal prices decreased
by 50% and 28%, respectively, whereas electricity pool price in England and Wales de-
clined by only 12% (Hunt, 2002). Finally, since the liberalised industries in Europe had
inherited surplus capacity from the state-owned systems, policies following the deregula-
tion were directed more at an ecient allocation of the given resources than supporting
generation investment (Finon et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, the issue of new investment in electricity generation has acquired a
greater urgency. New investment is required to replace the old and phased-out power
stations (Nagl et al., 2011) to comply with higher eciency standards and emerging
environmental norms. Indeed, concern about climate change has transformed the envi-
ronmental debate in Europe. The EU aims to limit the eects of global climate change,
which, according to the European Commission (EC), will require long-term stabilisation
of CO2 emissions levels (Fig. 1.2). This has been broken down into two main targets: (1)
by 2020, the EU should reduce its CO2 emissions by 30%, and (2) by 2050 by 60-80%,
from the levels in 1990. The EU aims to achieve its CO2 reduction targets by increas-
ing electricity generation from renewable resources and improving the eciency of both
demand and supply sides. However, while the share of renewable energy has increased
in recent years, this has had other impacts on the electricity industry. First, to attract
3investment in renewable generation, governments have provided generous subsidies that
have signicantly increased the retail prices of electricity. With feed-in taris 10 times
higher than the wholesale electricity price, German consumers spent e1.54 billion more on
electricity to fund renewable generation in 2001 alone (W ustenhagen and Bilharz, 2006).
Second, a large part of renewable generation, e.g., solar and wind, is intermittent, which
means that output cannot be controlled directly as in a gas- or coal-red power plant.
This has increased the volatility of electricity prices as a signicant share of the electricity
generation has become weather-dependent (Ketterer, 2014; Woo et al., 2011, Sioshansi et
al., 2011). While a large amount of wind generation during low demand periods results in
low market clearing prices and sporadically in negative prices (Nicolosi, 2010), unexpected
ramp-down of wind generation can lead to price jumps and even to system failures (Ela
and Kirby, 2008). A higher share of renewable energy in the total generation not only
results in volatile electricity prices but also puts a previously unexperienced strain on
the transmission network. In an electricity system adhering to the merit-order rule, wind
generation with zero marginal cost needs to be dispatched rst; however, guaranteeing
this grid access to wind energy with uctuating and geographically dispersed generation
leads to scarce electric network supply (Kunz, 2013). Consequently, further growth of in-
termittent generation, Kramer and Haigh (2009) argue, can even destabilise transmission
networks, thereby resulting in blackouts.
Figure 1.2: Historical and Predicted CO2 Emissions (IEO, 2013)
4Thus, deregulation and the so-called Energiewende (German energy transformation)
have ushered in undesirable consequences for the electricity industry. Higher price volatil-
ity threatens both large consumers, such as factories or hospitals, and producers as they
may become more exposed to risk. As a result, there is an urgent need for a more eective
risk management and a better understanding of strategic interaction when setting policy.
Otherwise, the very objectives of the sustainable energy transformation may be thwarted
as private investors become more reluctant to adopt new technologies. One of the main
tools for risk management in the electricity industry is the use of derivatives, i.e., nan-
cial products whose value depend on physical spot prices. The most liquid derivatives in
energy markets are futures contracts (Kovacevic et al., 2013). By entering into a futures
contract, i.e., a standardised exchange-traded contract, the counterparties agree on both
the price and the time period, stretching from weeks to years, of a sequence of future spot
deliveries. For electricity futures, we dierentiate between peak, o-peak, and base fu-
tures, specifying the delivery hours with high or low demand. The settlement of a contract
can be physical (actual delivery) or nancial (payment of the dierence of the futures price
and the spot price). Financial hedging, i.e., purchasing electricity futures, however, can
be costly and often does not provide adequate risk reduction. Indeed, futures contracts
can have high risk premia, the dierence between the expected and futures prices, and the
delivery periods seldom match the consumers' demand schedule (Geman, 2009). Further-
more, futures contracts do not provide hedges against physical risk, i.e., power outages,
whose nancial consequences can outweigh the potential payos from futures contracts.
In addition to increased price volatility, deregulation and renewable generation have also
aected the distribution systems. To integrate more intermittent generation, new trans-
mission lines need to be built, partly because the best available wind and solar sites are in
remote areas. Since the vertical unbundling of the electricity industry, the cost of trans-
mission expansion cannot be regained through retailing. Thus, under a market-oriented
regulation, transmission investment needs to be economically viable. At the same time, in
order to maintain system eciency, the cost of transmission expansion has to be allocated
in such way that it sends correct locational signals for future users (P erez-Arriaga, 2013).
Consequently, grid investment presents serious planning challenges because generation
investment decisions incorporating game-theoretic interactions between decision makers
in separate sectors are necessary for designing markets to obtain desirable outcomes.
This dissertation addresses these two concerns. First, a pair of studies shows that large
consumers can carry out better risk management using on-site generation, i.e., physical
hedges. Such on-site generation using CHP applications not only provides for better hedg-
ing strategies but also results in lower CO2 emissions because of higher overall eciencies
relative to large central power plants. Risk-mitigating strategies for on-site investment
and operations for long- and medium-term time-frames are provided from the perspective
of a large consumer. Next, in order to gain insights into the issues for policy-makers con-
5cerning transmission expansion, a bi-level programming model is developed to account for
the fact that investment decisions are carried out by separate agents. Thus, any decision
regarding transmission investments needs to consider how it would impact future gener-
ation investment, which, in turn, would impact system reliability and transmission costs.
In particular, the third study focuses on investment in wind energy, which makes up the
highest share of renewable generation and has the most volatile production source, imple-
mented through wind output scenarios. Finally, a comparison is made between dierent
market designs, both in terms of transmission expansion and the electricity producers'
degree of competitiveness.
1.1 Optimal Selection of Distributed Energy Resources
under Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
The probable severe economic and environmental consequences (Stern, 2006; Ciscar et
al., 2011) of climate change have prompted many countries to set a series of targets to
reduce their CO2 emissions. One of the ways in which the EU seeks to achieve its reduc-
tion targets is by improving energy eciency in terms of both supply and consumption
(European Commission, 2010). There is substantial scope for reducing CO2 emissions
through improved generation technologies. The current central-station model of electric-
ity production causes a loss of 35-60% of energy as heat waste, while a further 6% of
the generated electricity is lost during transmission (Marnay and Venkataramanan, 2006;
Graus and Worrell, 2009; Oswald, 2007; International Energy Agency Statistics, 2011).
Thus, the current energy production paradigm is not only polluting but also unsustain-
able in the wake of continued growth in demand. One possible solution is the use of
distributed energy resources (DER), i.e., small-scale generation sources located closer to
the end-users.
An innovative way to exploit the potential of DER is to group generation and as-
sociated loads together to form a microgrid (Fig. 1.3). While a microgrid operates
independently of the main grid, it can also be connected to it in order to take advantage
of lower system prices. Dierent generators can be used within a microgrid, but the most
promising technology is combined heat and power (CHP), also known as cogeneration.
CHP is an energy-converting process that utilises thermal energy, which would otherwise
be released into the environment unused. While conventional condensing technologies,
e.g., central-station fossil-fuelled and biomass-fuelled power stations, produce only elec-
tricity from the fuel used, a CHP plant produces both electricity and thermal power with
a higher overall energy conversion eciencies. Thus, even though large central stations
have higher electrical conversion eciencies, CHP plants produce more energy overall
because of their heat recovery property (Siddiqui and Marnay, 2008). Compared to the
6eciency of 35-60% for conventional power stations, CHP plants have overall eciencies
in the range of 80-90%. Despite the benecial characteristics of cogeneration, the penetra-
tion of CHP plants is relatively low. While in Denmark and Finland CHP plants produce
approximately 40-50% of the total electricity from heat recovery, EU and US averages of
CHP electricity production are only around 15% and 7%, respectively1.
Figure 1.3: Stylised Microgrid with CHP
Nevertheless, the potential of CHP is signicant with possible savings of up to 60%
in total eciency. This is why most countries have developed policies to support CHP
investment, e.g., the EU Cogeneration Directive dating back to 2004. However, the targets
regarding a higher share of cogeneration have not yet been achieved (Streckiene et al.,
2009). Some of the possible reasons for the lower than expected investments in CHP
are the uncertainties of electricity and gas prices in deregulated industries (European
Cogeneration Review - Germany, 2013). Financial risk is considered by Schleich and
Gruber (2008) and Wang et al. (2008) as one of the main barriers against investing in
energy-ecient technologies.
Considering this situation, in order to gain policy insights into the issues involved in
increasing eciency and reducing CO2 emissions, it is important to understand how the
risks associated with electricity and gas spot price uncertainties can be managed at the
consumer level. With this in mind, this study explores the roles of on-site generation (as
a physical hedge) and long-term electricity and gas futures contracts (as nancial hedges)
against energy price risk. A mean-risk optimisation model is developed for the long-term
risk management problem of a hypothetical microgrid using mixed-integer, multi-stage
stochastic programming. Since the potential of CHP to reduce CO2 emissions is markedly
high in Germany (Spitalny et al., 2013), we apply our model to a notional consumer in
1World Survey of Decentralized Energy, www.localpower.org.
7Germany by using electricity and gas price data from the European Energy Exchange
(EEX). Several cases of dierent on-site generation technologies are examined both with
and without nancial hedges. The study demonstrates that risk-averse consumers, even
if they face increasing gas prices and decreasing electricity prices, should invest in on-site
generation. While a decreasing gas spark spread, which is the dierence between the
price of electricity and eective cost of electricity generation from a gas-red power plant,
reduces the expected net present value (NPV) of on-site generation investment, the ability
of CHP to swap electricity (with high price volatility) for gas (with low price volatility)
signicantly increases the value of on-site generation as a physical hedge. This study also
examines how on-site generation interacts with nancial hedges, i.e., how the availability
of on-site generation aects the consumer's decision to purchase nancial hedges and vice
versa. In particular, the study shows that since investing in CHP reduces the microgrid's
demand for electricity futures, on-site generation and electricity futures may substitute
for one another. Conversely, when gas futures are available, the microgrid is more likely
to install a microturbine as on-site generation with xed fuel price results in larger risk
reduction. For this reason, if the the risk premium for gas futures decreases, the risk-
averse microgrid's demand increases for on-site generation, thereby indicating that gas
futures and on-site generation can function as complements.
1.2 Optimal Operation of Combined Heat and Power
under Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
Building on the dissertation's investment model for a microgrid, the medium-term oper-
ational risk management problem of a microgrid with installed CHP is further examined.
Unlike in the previous investment model, we account for peak and o-peak load electricity
price volatility, thereby providing further insights into how nancial risk can be mitigated
using on-site generation and the available nancial contracts for electricity and gas pur-
chases.
Stable electricity prices are vital for economic competitiveness (Laurijssen et al., 2012).
Since electricity and gas markets exhibit large volatility, uncontrolled exposure to price
risks could lead to severe nancial losses for producers and consumers. Thus, operational
decisions need to be evaluated in terms of not only the resulting expected costs but also of
cost variability (Bjorgan et al., 2009). Consequently, risk control constitutes an important
issue when formulating consumers' decision-making problems.
To hedge against such risks, large consumers can purchase electricity futures contracts
that provide increased stability compared to spot prices and are more ecient than futures
contracts on related fuel prices (Tanlapco et al., 2002). Deng and Oren (2006) highlight
the roles of these electricity derivatives in mitigating market risks and structuring the
8hedging strategies in various risk management applications. On the other hand, Newbery
(2012) points out that gas and coal are naturally hedged in markets where the wholesale
electricity prices are set by the prices of fossil fuels. For example, if there is a strong
positive correlation between the electricity price and the price of natural gas, a gas-red
generator is not burdened by an increase in the gas price as this inevitably triggers higher
electricity price, thereby maintaining the generator's prot level. However, as Lin and
Wesseh (2013) point out, gas price can exhibit dierent volatility regimes, and when it
switches to a high volatility regime, the correlation between electricity and gas prices
signicantly diminishes. Consequently, the strategy for managing risk needs to consider
both electricity and gas markets uncertainty at the same time. In this study, we present a
multi-stage, stochastic mean-risk operational optimisation model that can be used to re-
duce a microgrid's risk exposure. The model examines natural hedging through existing
on-site generation and nancial hedging through implementing the available electricity
and gas futures purchases in the German context.
While the ndings suggest that a microgrid with on-site generation alone can certainly
reduce its expected generation costs, a microgrid with CHP can lower the expected costs
much more signicantly, i.e., on average about 8.7-fold more than a microturbine with-
out heat recovery. Furthermore, on-site generation with CHP can reduce the microgrid's
CVaR both in absolute terms and relative to its expected cost, while the CVaR reduc-
tion with a conventional microturbine is negligible and only due to lower expected cost.
This demonstrates the distinctive capability of a CHP unit to reduce a consumer's risk
exposure, which is not apparent from the dissertation's long-term investment model.
1.3 Transmission and Wind Investment in a Deregu-
lated Electricity Industry
In regulated electricity industries, the transmission expansion planning involves minimis-
ing investment costs subject to reliability constraints regarding future demand and gen-
eration conguration (Georgilakis, 2010). As both generation and transmission invest-
ments are made by a central utility, only the future demand remains uncertain and the
cost of such expansion projects can be recouped through rate-based revenues, which are
composed of the depreciated cost (original cost minus cumulative depreciation) of the
existing transmission network plus the forecasted cost of incremental capital expenditure
(L ev^ eque, 2006). Thus, such problems can often be addressed by linear programming or
dynamic programming models. In recent years, however, the electricity industry has been
undergoing deregulation, thereby creating private power companies and TSOs. Hence,
understanding their strategic interactions in handling transmission and generation ex-
pansion poses novel modelling challenges (Hobbs, 1995).
9The ongoing restructuring of the electricity industry, both domestic and cross-border,
has led to a growing attention to transmission capacity expansion, which plays a central
role in the EU 2020 plan (Communication from the European Commission, 2014). First,
to achieve a common European power market, it is essential to have sucient cross-
border transmission capacities. Such a pan-European integrated energy market would
result in lower prices and more reliable supply (Schaber et al., 2012; Concha et al., 2014).
Second, grid extensions are necessary for the physical integration of variable renewable
energy sources: both wind and solar energy have greater potential on the periphery of
Europe, and, thus, integrating them would require the construction of new transmission
lines both within and between countries (Boie et al., 2014). However, it is not always in
the interest of TSOs to upgrade their grid networks since increasing transmission capacity
reduces their ability to charge for transmitting electricity (Hogan et al., 2010), or even if
they have sucient incentives to invest, then TSOs might not have the required capital
to build new transmission lines (Henriot, 2013). Similarly, investor-owned utility (IOU)
companies cannot be expected to make future investments estimated to be worth e1
trillion (Communication from the European Commission, 2014), which is roughly twice
as much as the market capitalisation of all European utility companies (The Economist,
2013).
One approach to the problem of transmission expansion in deregulated industries is
performance-based regulation (PBR), or incentivised regulation, which is characterised
by two main properties: it gives a regulated rm the choice of prices for its services and it
rewards the rm for investments that enhance the general welfare. Thus, its aim is to cre-
ate a price regulation mechanism that incentivises both eective capacity utilisation and
capacity expansion for the transmission system operator (TSO). However, because of the
information asymmetry between the regulator and TSOs, the specied transmission costs
and rewards often fail to provide correct signals, thereby leading to suboptimal transmis-
sion and generation investments (Nasser, 1997; Vogelsang, 2006). Yu et al. (1999) have
examined the problem of dynamic decision making for transmission management under
deregulation. They conclude that transmission congestion rents are necessary to prevent
the network from overloading and could serve as the basis for developing a uniform ap-
proach to long-term transmission investment incentives.
Another approach is the merchant model, which is built on the idea of using market
incentives instead of central planning decisions whenever possible. The merchant model is
based on the auction of nancial transmission rights (FTRs). Agents bid for transmission
expansion, and the winning bidder is allocated long-term FTRs in exchange for the in-
vestment. The FTRs give the owners the right to collect the dierence in the connecting
nodal prices calculated by the TSO, whose role is to balance the supply and demand in
the whole network. FTRs are most commonly used in the Northeastern US, but they have
been also applied in several European projects. Nevertheless, because of their complex-
10ity, it is very dicult to design FTRs eciently. Bushnell and Stoft (1997) recommend
the use of feasibility restrictions and tradable transmission rights, such as transmission
congestion contracts (TCCs), which not only would guarantee the prot coming from the
dierence of the nodal prices when electricity is transferred but also would be refunded
for the unused portion of this right. Furthermore, in discussing the positive and negative
externalities of building a line, they point out that TCCs do not necessarily capture the
full range of benets of the grid expansion. The diculties arise mainly from loop ows:
in accordance with Kircho's second circuit law, the directed sum of voltages around any
closed circuit must be zero. For example, in a 3-node network, the voltages at two nodes
determine the voltage at the remaining node (Fig. 1.4). Therefore, the way the electricity
reaches the load depends on the potential dierences. Hence, in a transmission network
with multiple circuits, electricity ow does not necessarily go through the newly built line.
Figure 1.4: Voltage Law (Huppmann and Kunz, 2011)
Our third study addresses the transmission expansion problem in a deregulated in-
dustry. Market designs are compared with either a welfare-maximising TSO or a prot-
maximising merchant investor (MI) via a stochastic bi-level programming model that has
either the TSO or the MI making transmission investment decisions at the upper level,
and power producers determining generation investment and operation at the lower level
while facing wind power variability. The ndings suggest that social welfare is always
higher under the TSO because the MI has an incentive to boost the congestion rents, i.e.,
the scarcity rent on the lines, by restricting the capacities of transmission lines. Such
strategic behaviour also limits investment in wind power by producers. However, regard-
less of the market design (MI or TSO), when producers behave according to the Cournot
conjecture, a higher proportion of energy is produced by wind. In eect, withholding of
generation capacity by producers prompts more transmission investment since the TSO
aims to increase welfare by subsidising wind power and the MI creates more ow to
maximise prots.
111.4 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, a mean-risk optimi-
sation model is developed for the long-term risk management problem of a hypothetical
microgrid using mixed-integer, multi-stage stochastic programming. The modelled micro-
grid can invest in a number of generation technologies and also has access to electricity and
gas futures markets to reduce its nancial risk. Chapter 3 assesses how a microgrid with
an installed CHP and a boiler unit can manage risk using monthly and weekly electricity
futures contracts, monthly gas futures contracts, and on-site generation. A multi-stage,
mean-risk optimisation model is formulated for the medium-term operational risk man-
agement of a large consumer using daily peak and o-peak periods. Chapter 4 considers
the problems of both wind generation and transmission line investment. A stochastic bi-
level programming model is developed to examine how transmission expansion interacts
with the strategic behaviour of the incumbent electricity producers and potential wind
energy investors facing uncertain wind availability. Chapter 5 concludes with a discus-
sion on the ndings as well as the limitations of the current approaches besides making
recommendations for future research in these areas.
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Optimal Selection of Distributed
Energy Resources under Uncertainty
and Risk Aversion
2.1 Introduction
Due to a combination of recent deregulation and technological advances in small-scale
generation, such as the pairing of proton exchange membrane fuel cells with combustion
turbines (Arsalis at al., 2011), consumers now have the opportunity to reap the benets
of small-scale electricity generation. However, uncertain electricity and gas prices of-
ten deter potential investors from installing on-site generation. This represents a missed
opportunity for the electricity industry in terms of improved sustainability. Although
policymakers have set ambitious targets, decisions relating to the adoption of new tech-
nologies are typically made by power companies and large consumers, e.g., residential
estates, oce buildings, and factories, who are motivated by their own private incentives
to maximise prot or to minimise cost.
Since the late 1980s, policymakers have gradually deregulated electricity industries
with the intention of increasing competition between producers (Wilson, 2002). Conse-
quently, the 1990s saw the introduction of several directives from the EU that sought to
extend the single market principle to the electricity market (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).
However, deregulation often resulted in awed market designs, which led to market power
abuse and spot price volatility (Woo et al., 2006). In addition, in Europe, intermittent
generation has increased more than ve fold since 20021, thereby resulting in more fre-
quent price jumps and negative electricity prices, as well, while the gas price has been
aected by political uncertainties in Ukraine (Chow and Elkind, 2009; Goldthau and
Boersma, 2014). As a result of such market uncertainties, energy producers and con-
1Energy statistics. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics explained/index.php/Renewable energy statistics
13sumers face increased exposure to nancial risk, which aects their decisions to launch
new projects. Yet, new investments are required to replace inecient technologies with
high CO2 emissions, which must be done in order to meet increasing electricity demands.
Considering this situation, in order to gain policy insights about increasing eciency
and reducing CO2 emissions, it is important to understand how the risk associated with
electricity and gas spot price uncertainty can be managed at the consumer level. With
this in mind, we discuss, in relation to a hypothetical microgrid, the development of a
mean-risk optimisation model for DG adoption under uncertainty using mixed-integer
multi-stage stochastic programming. While microgrid systems may employ a wide range
of distributed energy technologies, e.g., microturbines, solar photovoltaic (PV) panels or
micro-scale wind turbines (Fig. 2.1), for now, we assume that the microgrid can use
only gas-red combustion engines, and it applies advanced controls to manage its loads
and to connect to the main grid if it is necessary or favourable. We explore the roles
of on-site generation as a physical hedge and electricity and gas futures contracts as -
nancial hedges against energy price risk. We examine several cases of dierent on-site
generation technologies both with and without nancial hedges. We demonstrate that
risk-averse consumers, even if they face increasing gas prices and a decreasing electricity
prices, should invest in on-site generation to meet their electricity and heating demands.
While a decreasing gas spark spread, the estimated gross margin of a gas-red power
plant from selling a unit of electricity, reduces the expected NPV of on-site generation
investment, the ability of CHP to swap electricity (with high price volatility) for gas (with
low price volatility) increases the value of on-site generation as a physical hedge signi-
cantly. We also examine how on-site generation interacts with nancial hedges, i.e., how
the availability of on-site generation aects the consumer's decision to purchase nancial
hedges and vice versa. In particular, we show that, while on-site generation and electricity
futures may substitute one another, on-site generation and gas futures can function as
complements.
14Figure 2.1: Schematic Diagram of a Microgrid (New York State Report, 2012)
2.2 Literature Review
The benets of on-site generation and CHP have been analysed using deterministic,
real options, and stochastic programming approaches. From a deterministic perspec-
tive, Madlener and Schmid (2003) examine the economic adoption and diusion of CHP
generation. They nd signicant regional dierences in the adoption of CHP technologies,
which could not be explained by NPV calculations. To study the economics of microgrids,
the Berkeley Lab has developed the distributed energy resources customer adoption model
(DER-CAM), which provides decision support for individual customer sites (Marnay et
al., 2001; Siddiqui et al., 2003). The main objective of the model is to nd the combina-
tion of generation investments with the lowest operational cost given utility taris, fuel
costs, CO2 tax rate, and equipment performance characteristics (Fig. 2.2). Siddiqui et
al. (2005) use DER-CAM to compare the economic benet of installing dierent types of
DER at a hypothetical microgrid in California. Using mixed-integer linear programming,
they demonstrate that an optimally run microgrid with gas-red CHP turbines has, on
average, lower CO2 emissions than microturbines without heat exchangers. Siddiqui et al.
(2007) analyse the conditions under which a microgrid with CHP is protable, particularly
when also equipped with heat storage technology. Siler-Evans et al. (2011) investigate
why the adoption of small-scale distributed generation (DG) has been slow, despite its
frequently cited benets. They nd that uncertainty in future fuel and electricity prices
represents signicant economic risk and suggest feed-in taris for its mitigation.
15Figure 2.2: High-Level Schematic of the Inputs and Outputs of DER-CAM. (Marnay et
al., 2008)
Addressing the uncertainty of electricity prices, Fleten et al. (2007) apply real options
valuation to investments in decentralised renewable power generation. Results from a
case of wind power generation for an oce building suggest that, within the context of
uncertain electricity prices, the threshold price for investment is higher than the NPV
break-even price. Maribu and Fleten (2008) use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the
value of CHP under uncertain electricity and natural gas prices. They nd that cogen-
eration is particularly attractive with volatile electricity prices because the CHP plant's
ability to respond to high prices provides ecient hedges to energy cost risk. Wickart
and Madlener (2007) use real options to analyse an industrial rm's choice to invest in a
CHP system over a conventional heat-only generation system (steam boiler) with all elec-
tricity purchased from the grid. They argue that under higher price volatility levels, the
CHP system is a better choice than the conventional heat-only generation. Siddiqui and
Maribu (2009) examine the eects of a sequential strategy on the investment decision of a
microgrid when capacity and heat exchange upgrade options are available. They conclude
that a direct investment strategy is preferred with a combined distributed generation and
heat exchange system compared to the sequential strategy due to the cost savings from
heat production and capture.
Although the real options approach can be used to analyse investment under uncer-
tainty, it does not lead to better decision making in terms of risk reduction. Stochas-
tic programming provides a more appropriate framework for modelling decision-making
problems under uncertainty. Unlike deterministic optimisation models, stochastic pro-
gramming models encompass uncertain problem data in the form of a random matrix
with estimated probability distribution. In general, stochastic programs can be grouped
into recourse problems and chance-constrained problems. Chance-constrained problems
involve only here-and-now decisions, i.e., all decisions are taken simultaneously prior to
16the realisation of uncertain parameters. Furthermore, in chance-constrained problems,
constraints involving random parameters must be satised with only a prescribed prob-
ability. In contrast to chance-constrained problems, in recourse problems, all constraints
need to be satised with certainty, which allows for corrective actions to be taken at future
stages once uncertain parameters are observed. Since, unlike real options, a risk term can
be easily incorporated in the objective function, stochastic programming with recourse
is the most suitable framework to analyse risk management. Its objective is to nd a
feasible solution that optimises a cost function that depends on decisions and uncertain
parameters. In problems related to energy, various constraints, e.g., demand or capacity
constraints, need to be satised with certainty. Thus, in this study, we consider only
stochastic programming with recourse. For a general description of stochastic program-
ming, see Kall and Wallace (1994), and Birge and Louveaux (1997).
Since the deregulation of the electricity industry, stochastic programming has been
widely applied within the power sector. Fleten and Kristoersen (2007) compare stochas-
tic programming and deterministic approaches to the bidding strategies of a Norwegian
hydropower producer. They nd that using a stochastic programming model is, on av-
erage, more protable than using the solution of the deterministic approach. The de-
terministic model can lead to huge losses if the realised price diers from the price for
which the model is optimised. Also, the solution of the stochastic programming model
is more robust as it takes various price scenarios into account. Kettunen et al. (2011)
analyse the impact of carbon price uncertainty on investments in the energy sector. Us-
ing a multi-stage stochastic optimisation model, they nd that carbon price shocks deter
smaller companies and that current carbon policies may, therefore, result in market con-
centration.
We apply stochastic programming to the CHP investment problem of a microgrid,
which has been examined previously using only deterministic models and real options.
Analogous to Wickart and Madlener (2007), we take the perspective of a large consumer
facing uncertain fuel and electricity prices, but our study also provides insights into the
interaction of nancial hedges and on-site generation focusing on a microgrid's risk man-
agement. Finally, we report on how dierent technologies can contribute to reaching the
2020 CO2 emissions targets.
2.3 Model Description
Our model addresses the investment problem of a hypothetical commercial microgrid with
electricity and heat loads. Initially, the microgrid consists only of a gas-red boiler, but
it has the option to invest in microturbines, with or without heat exchangers, at the be-
ginning of the time horizon. If this option is not exercised, then the microgrid can meet
its electricity loads only through purchasing electricity on the spot and futures markets.
17Similarly, without CHP, the microgrid covers all of its heat loads by purchasing gas on the
spot and futures markets for its boiler. To begin with, we assume that both electricity
and gas and futures contracts are physically settled. If a microturbine without a heat
exchanger is installed, then the microgrid can meet its electricity demand with on-site
generation, for which the gas is purchased on the spot and futures markets. On the other
hand, if CHP is installed, then the microgrid also has the possibility to recover the heat
waste from its electricity generation and utilise it to supply its heat loads. The energy
ows with dierent technologies are indicated in Fig. 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Stylised Microgrid with CHP
We assume that the microgrid is a price taker and that it faces uncertain electricity and
gas spot prices. By contrast, since energy loads in commercial buildings can be forecast
with high accuracy (Zhao and Magoul es, 2012), we assume that both electricity and heat
loads are known in advance. Thus, the microgrid makes its investment and futures con-
tracting decisions without knowing spot price realisations, but it can purchase additional
electricity and gas later when their spot prices are known. Therefore, the microgrid's
investment problem can be formulated using mixed-integer multi-stage stochastic pro-
gramming with recourse. To take into account possible risk preferences, we assume that
the microgrid's objective is to minimise its expected cost plus a risk measure with weight
B. For the risk measure, we use the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR), which estimates
the expected loss with a condence level A 2 [0;1) in the worst 1   A cases (Fig. 2.4).
CVaR is formulated with the help of the value-at-risk (VaR), which denes losses at the
A percentile. As VaR is a threshold value, i.e., the probability that the loss exceeds this
value is 1 A, in contrast to CVaR, it does not provide any information regarding the size
of loss beyond this level. In addition, unlike VaR, CVaR is a coherent risk measure, i.e., it
does not violate the sub-additivity property. The CVaR of a portfolio of dierent assets
18is always less than the sum of CVaRs of all assets independently. Finally, as CVaR can
be formulated using linear programming, it is suitable for optimisation problems (Artzner
et al., 1999; Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000). Thus, we apply CVaR to examine dierent
regimes for the microgrid in terms of risk aversion, such as B = 0 for risk neutral and
B > 0 for risk averse.
Figure 2.4: CVaR in Relation to VaR
2.3.1 Decision-Making Framework
The time horizon of the optimisation problem is divided into main periods indexed by
t 2 T := f1;:::;Tg, each of which is split into subperiods, indexed by m 2 M :=
f1;:::;Mg (see Fig. 2.5). The decision to invest in on-site generation has to be made at
the beginning of the rst main period, i.e., at t = 1, and is eective immediately. At the
beginning of every main period, the microgrid can decide to reduce its risk exposure by
purchasing electricity and gas futures. Subsequently, the microgrid can adjust its futures
purchases by going on the spot market to purchase electricity and gas at their realised
prices in each subperiod within that main period. Similarly, the microgrid also decides at
each subperiod how much electricity to generate. After the last subperiod, a new main
period starts, in which all decisions on futures and spot purchases are repeated.
Figure 2.5: Decision-Making Timeline
192.3.2 Problem Formulation
The microgrid's investment problem is formulated as a mixed-integer stochastic program,
in which the objective is to minimise the expected present value of its cost plus the
CVaR with B weight. Because of the stochastic and combinatorial nature of these prob-
lems, solving a mixed-integer stochastic program can lead to computational diculties.
This is why it is essential to test and compare the results of multiple solvers and algo-
rithms when we attempt to solve such a problem. The notation and the mathematical
formulation are stated below. The uncertain price processes are represented through a
combination of a scenario tree (main scenarios) and scenario fans (subscenarios). The
detailed scenario generation method is provided in Section 2.4.1. An essential part of
the problem formulation in stochastic programming models is the implementation of the
non-anticipativity principle, i.e., decisions need to be taken without knowing in advance
the future outcomes. Thus, note that the investment decision (wi) is the same in every
main scenarios and subscenarios, whereas the futures purchase decisions (xf
st
1,yf
st
1, zf
st
1) are
the same for each subscenario at a main scenario node, thereby guaranteeing that the
non-anticipativity conditions for both the investment decisions and futures purchases are
satised, Eqs. (2.9){(2.11).
2.3.3 Notation
Sets
b(st
1) 2 S
t 1
1 : ancestor to path st
1
i 2 I: technology index
I: set of technologies
m: subperiod index, m = 1;:::;M
st
1 2 St
1: the index of a particular main scenario path in the scenario tree at main time
period t
St
1: set of all possible main scenario paths in the scenario tree at main time period t
s2 2 S2: the index of a particular subscenario path
S2: set of all possible subscenario paths at a a given node in the scenario tree
t: main time period index, t = 1;:::;T
Fixed Parameters
A: condence level for the CVaR
B: weight of CVaR
C: CO2 emissions rate of the microgrid from burning gas on-site (ton of CO2/MWh)
De: electricity load in each subperiod (MWe)
Dh: heat load in each subperiod (MW)
20Eb: boiler conversion eciency, i.e., units of useful heat produced from one MWh of
natural gas (MWh/MWh)
Ee
i: electrical conversion eciency, i.e., units of electricity produced from one MWh of
natural gas, of technology i (MWhe/MWh)
Eh
i : heat capture rate from CHP, i.e., units of useful heat produced from one MWhe of
electricity, of technology i (MWh/MWhe)
Ho: length of each main period in years (a)
Hq: length of each subperiod in years (a)
J = 8760: number of hours in a year (h/a)
Ke
i: capacity of electricity generation unit of technology i (MWe)
Kb: capacity of boiler unit (MW)
Lc: tax on CO2 emissions (e/ton)
Ni: the amortised cost over T M subperiods of installing technology i, paid per subpe-
riod (e)
Qst
1: probability of main scenario path st
1 at main time period t
Qs2: conditional probability of subscenario path s2 within a particular main scenario
R: risk-free interest rate per annum
V e: variable operating and maintenance (O&M) cost of electricity generation (e/MWh)
Random Parameters
F e
st
1: multi-subperiod-ahead forward price of electricity purchased during main scenario st
1
at the beginning of main period t and delivered in all subscenario paths s2 and in each
subperiod m within this main scenario path and main time period (e/MWhe)
F
g
st
1: multi-subperiod-ahead forward price of natural gas purchased during main scenario
st
1 at the beginning of main period t and delivered in all subscenario paths s2 and in each
subperiod m within this main scenario path and main time period (e/MWh)
P e
st
1;s2;m: spot price of electricity in scenario path st
1 in main period t and in subscenario
path s2 at subperiod m (e/MWhe)
P
g
st
1;s2;m: spot price of gas in scenario path st
1 in main period t and in subscenario path s2
at subperiod m (e/MWh)
2.3.4 Decision Variables
st
1: present value of the cumulative cost of satisfying the electricity and heat loads in
main scenario path st
1 2 St
1 up until main period t (e)
st
1: auxiliary variable in main scenario path st
1 2 St
1 during main period t to calculate
the CVaR, it is equal to the amount of cumulative cost, st
1, which exceeds the VaR, and
21it is equal to 0 if the cumulative cost is smaller than the VaR (e)
: VaR at condence level A (e)
$st
1: the expected present value at beginning of main period t of the spot operational and
amortised capital cost of all subperiods m during main period t
st
1 the total cost of purchasing futures for the microgrid in scenario path st
1 2 St
1 at the
beginning of main period t (e)
	: the total amortised capital cost for the selected technologies (e)

st
1;s2;m: the total spot operational cost of the microgrid in scenario path st
1 2 St
1 during
main period t and in subscenario path s2 2 S2 during subperiod m (e)
hi;st
1;s2;m: recovered heat from technology i used to meet heat load in main scenario path
st
1 2 St
1 during main period t and in subscenario path s2 2 S2 during subperiod m (MWh)
wi: binary variable, now-or-never decision to install technology i at t = 1
xst
1;s2;m: electricity purchased from the spot market in main scenario path st
1 2 St
1 during
main period t and in subscenario path s2 2 S2 during subperiod m (MWhe)
xf
st
1: electricity futures purchased at main scenario path st
1 2 St
1 at the beginning of main
period t, which are divided into equal quantities that are delivered in all subscenario paths
s2 2 S2 in each subperiod m (MWhe)
yi;st
1;s2;m: natural gas purchased from the spot market for cogeneration in technology i in
main scenario path st
1 2 St
1 during main period t and in subscenario path s2 2 S2 during
subperiod m (MWh)
yf
i;st
1: natural gas futures purchased for cogeneration in technology i for delivery in main
scenario path st
1 2 St
1 at the beginning of main period t, which are divided into equal
quantities that are delivered in all subscenario paths s2 2 S2 in each subperiod m (MWh)
zst
1;s2;m: natural gas purchased from the spot market for boiler in main scenario path
st
1 2 St
1 during main period t and in subscenario path s2 2 S2 during subperiod m
(MWh)
zf
st
1: natural gas futures purchased for boiler for delivery in main scenario path st
1 2 St
1 at
the beginning of main period t, which are divided into equal quantities that are delivered
in all subscenario paths s2 2 S2 in each subperiod m (MWh)
2.3.5 Mathematical Formulation
Objective Function
The objective function in Eq. (2.1) minimises the expected present value of the microgrid
(rst term) plus a weighted CVaR of the cost (second term):
minimise
h;w;x;y;z;xf;yf;zf;;
X
sT
1 2 ST
1
QsT
1 sT
1 + B
0
@ +
1
1   A
X
sT
1 2ST
1
QsT
1 sT
1
1
A (2.1)
22Constraints
Eqs. (2.2){(2.3) dene the CVaR constraint of the present value of the cumulative cost
of running the microgrid, 8sT
1 2 ST
1 . Since the auxiliary variable, st
1, is nonnegative,
the term  + 1
1 A
P
sT
1 2ST
1 QsT
1 sT
1 is only minimised in (2.1), if the VaR, , is exactly the
cost at A quantile, as any decrease (increase) in the value of  would not be oset by the
decrease (increase) in the value of 1
1 A
P
sT
1 2ST
1 QsT
1 sT
1 , thereby concurrently determining
the VaR and the expected loss beyond the VaR, and, hence the CVaR:
sT
1      sT
1  0 (2.2)
sT
1  0 (2.3)
The constraint in Eq. (2.4) updates the present value of the cost of energy provision:
st
1 =
(
$st
1 + st
1 if t = 1
b(st
1) + (1 + RHq) (t 1)M($st
1 + st
1) otherwise, 8st
1 2 St
1
(2.4)
The constraint in Eq. (2.5) calculates the expected present value at the beginning of
the main period t for all spot operational and amortised capital cost within main period
t, 8st
1 2 St
1:
$st
1 =
X
s22S2
Qs2
 
M X
m=1
(1 + RHq)
 m(	 + 
st
1;s2;m)
!
(2.5)
Eqs. (2.6){(2.8) give the amortised capital, futures, and spot operational costs, respec-
tively, 8st
1 2 St
1;8s2 2 S2;8t;8m:
	 =
X
i2I
wiNi (2.6)
st
1 =
X
i2I
(F
g
st
1 + V
e + L
cC)y
f
i;st
1 + F
e
st
1x
f
st
1 + (F
g
st
1 + L
cC)z
f
st
1 (2.7)

st
1;s2;m =
X
i2I
(P
g
st
1;s2;m + V
e + L
cC)yi;st
1;s2;m + P
e
st
1;s2;mxst
1;s2;m + (P
g
st
1;s2;m + L
cC)zst
1;s2;m
(2.8)
Eqs. (2.9){(2.10) ensure that the electricity and heat demands are met, respectively,
238st
1 2 St
1;8s2 2 S2;8t;8m:
xst
1;s2;m +
xf
st
1
M
+
X
i2I
E
e
i
 
yi;st
1;s2;m +
yf
i;st
1
M
!
 D
eHqJ (2.9)
X
i2I
hi;st
1;s2;m + E
b
 
zst
1;s2;m +
zf
st
1
M
!
 D
hHqJ (2.10)
Eq. (2.11) restricts the use of recovered heat, 8i 2 I;8st
1 2 St
1;8s2 2 S2;8t;8m:
hi;st
1;s2;m  E
h
i E
e
i
 
yi;st
1;s2;m +
yf
i;st
1
M
!
(2.11)
Eqs. (2.12){(2.13) ensure that the DER and boiler capacity limits are observed, re-
spectively, 8st
1 2 St
1;8s2 2 S2;8t;8m:
E
e
i
 
yi;st
1;s2;m +
yf
i;st
1
M
!
 wiK
e
iHqJ;8i 2 I (2.12)
E
b
 
zst
1;s2;m +
zf
st
1
M
!
 K
bHqJ (2.13)
Finally, all decision variables must be non-negative, 8i 2 I;8st
1 2 St
1;8s2 2 S2;8t;8m:
hi;st
1;s2;m  0;wi 2 f0;1g;xst
1;s2;m  0;yi;st
1;s2;m  0;zst
1;s2;m  0;x
f
st
1  0;y
f
i;st
1  0;z
f
st
1  0
(2.14)
2.4 Numerical Examples
2.4.1 Data and Cases
While Europe has a relatively high level of CHP production, e.g., more than 50% of
Denmark's power generation comes from CHP (European Cogeneration Review, 2013),
the potential for further CHP implementation is substantial. For example, Golbach (2013)
estimates that over 50% of the Germany's total electricity demand could be provided
through CHP. Accordingly, Germany has passed three dierent legislations since 2002
promoting the adoption of CHP with the aim to increase its rate of cogeneration from the
24Figure 2.6: Daily Average Electricity Price
Figure 2.7: Daily Average Gas Price
current level of 14.5% to 25% by 2020 (Kraft-W arme-Kopplungs-Gesetz, 2012). However,
due to factors like uncertain energy prices and economic stagnation, the trajectory of CHP
adoption relative to the 25% target has been unsatisfactory during the past few years. To
examine the risk exposure of a hypothetical German microgrid with CHP and to study
ways to mitigate it, we implemented a case study by estimating price parameters from the
European Energy Exchange's (EEX) German electricity and gas spot markets, and Phelix
and Natural Gas Futures markets from 2007-2012. While historical data for German
electricity prices are available since 2002, the natural gas trading was launched only in
2007 (EEX Report, 2014), which, unfortunately, restricts our sample size signicantly.
The electricity and gas price scenarios are constructed in two steps. First, we use the
scenario tree method to generate average electricity (  P e
st
1) and gas (  P
g
st
1) prices within every
main period. Second, based on average prices within the main period, we generate scenario
paths using the scenario fan method for electricity (P e
st
1;s2;m) and gas (P
g
st
1;s2;m) spot prices
for each subscenario and subperiod (Fig. 2.8). We solve the optimisation problem over
a time horizon of eight years. Since a scenario tree-based problem combining two price
processes scales exponentially with the number of decision stages, we limit the number
of stages in the scenario tree to keep the problem computationally tractable. Using four
25main periods with two uncertainties gives us 64 (22(T 1)) dierent main scenarios and
with 10 subscenarios for each node in the main scenario tree, this produces 640 dierent
scenarios in total. Each main period covers two years, and since we have eight subperiods
per a main period, a subperiod covers a quarter. We use yearly average electricity and gas
prices to estimate the parameters for the scenario tree and quarterly average electricity and
gas spot prices to estimate the parameters for the scenario fan (Table 2.1). Geometric
Brownian motion is one of the most frequently used price processes in a discrete-time
lattice-based model (Cox et al., 1979). While GBMs do not take into account important
characteristics of commodity price dynamics (i.e., mean reversion or jumps in electricity
price), these eects on modelling long-term average prices can be negligible (Pindyck,
1999). Consequently, GBM is used widely to model long-term electricity and gas prices
(Fleten et al., 2007). To invoke GBM to model a price process, several assumptions must
be met. The logarithm of ratios of consecutive prices need to be normally distributed with
constant mean and variance and they have to be independent of their past values (Marathe
and Ryan, 2005). To check the normality assumptions for quarterly average electricity
prices (Fig. 2.9), we run the Shapiro-Wilk test (Sheskin, 2003), and to assess serial
independence, we run the Breusch-Godfrey test (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). Based
on obtained p-values (Table 2.2), we cannot reject the hypotheses that quarterly average
electricity and gas prices follow GBMs. On the other hand, we nd signicant correlation
between quarterly electricity and gas prices (p = 0:01). Nevertheless, since our sample
size is too small, these tests have low statistical power, and we cannot apply them with
any reliability for yearly average prices. Still, our data support more the assumptions of
correlated GBMs than that of other processes, i.e., mean-reversion, therefore, we assume
that in our model both long-term and short-term price processes follow correlated GBMs.
Regardless of the possible aws associated with such a sample size, our aim is not to
predict future prices but to generate feasible scenarios that reect price uncertainties
(Schumacher, 1993).
Table 2.1: Estimated Parameters for Electricity and Gas Prices
Electricity Gas
Starting price (e/MWh) 49.0 21.0
Yearly average spot price:
Price volatility (e
o,g
o) 27.5% 22.5%
Price correlation (o) 0.80
Quarter-yearly average spot price:
Price volatility (e
q,g
q) 30.1% 18.9%
Price correlation (q ) 0.83
Two-yearly futures:
Risk premium (Re,Rg) 13% 3%
26(a) Main Scenarios (b) Subscenarios
Figure 2.8: Scenario Generation
Table 2.2: Goodness of Fit
Shapiro-Wilk Test Breusch-Godfrey Test
Quarterly average electricity price p = 0:07 p = 0:58
Quarterly average gas price p = 0:34 p = 0:31
The scenario tree is generated through an extension of the log-transformed binomial
lattice (Gamba and Trigeorgis, 2001). At end of each main period, the average electricity
(gas) price can increase, Ue
st
1 = +1 (U
g
st
1 = +1), or decrease Ue
st
1 =  1 (U
g
st
1 =  1). Thus,
from each node there are four branches, each corresponding to a dierent state of the
average electricity and gas prices. The scenarios generated from the scenario tree are
Figure 2.9: Quarterly Average Electricity Price
27called main scenarios and are indexed by st
1 2 St
1. We assume that the long-term average
gas and electricity prices follow GBMs with zero drift.
ln  P
e
st
1 = ln  P
e
st 1
1 + 
e
o
p
HoU
e
st
1 (2.15)
ln  P
g
st
1 = ln  P
g
st 1
1
+ 
g
o
p
HoU
g
st
1 (2.16)
(U
e
st
1;U
g
st
1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
(+1;+1) with probability
(1+o)
4
(+1; 1) with probability
(1 o)
4
( 1;+1) with probability
(1 o)
4
( 1; 1) with probability
(1+o)
4
(2.17)
Once we generate for each main period and main scenario the average electricity (  P e
st
1)
and gas (  P
g
st
1) prices, we generate scenario paths based on a scenario fan, which are referred
to as subscenarios and indexed by s2 2 S2. This way, we obtain the electricity (P e
st
1;s2;m)
and gas (P
g
st
1;s2;m) spot prices for each subscenario and subperiod based on the average price
within the main scenario. Similarly as above, we assume that prices in subperiods follow
correlated GBMs with zero drifts and are generated through the well-known stochastic
dierential equation of the correlated GBMs (Hull, 2012). In a discrete-time GBM with
zero drift, the dierence follows a Wiener process. Accordingly, in correlated GBMs, the
corresponding Wiener processes are correlated:
P
e
st
1;s2;m0 =  P
e
st
1 +
m0 X
m=1

e
q
e
st
1;s2;m (2.18)
P
g
st
1;s2;m0 =  P
g
st
1 +
m0 X
m=1
(
g
qq
e
st
1;s2;m + 
g
q
q
1   2
q
g
st
1;s2;m) (2.19)
where e
st
1;s2;m  N(0;1) and 
g
st
1;s2;m  N(0;1). Finally, the prices of electricity (F e
st
1)
and gas (F
g
st
1) futures contracts are calculated as the expected spot price in the main
scenario st
1, where Qs2 is the probability of subscenario s2, multiplied by the risk premia
(Re for electricity futures and Rg for gas futures) representing the persistent dierences
between the futures prices and their expected spot prices (Kettunen et al., 2010), which
are estimated using past futures prices and average spot prices (Table 2.1):
28F e
st
1 =

P
s22S2 Qs2
1
M
M P
m=1
P e
st
1;s2;m

(1 + Re) (2.20)
F
g
st
1 =

P
s22S2 Qs2
1
M
M P
m=1
P
g
st
1;s2;m

(1 + Rg) (2.21)
We illustrate the eect of physical and nancial hedges on the decision-making process
through several cases, which dier in terms of available hedges (Table 2.3). The micro-
turbine parameters (Table 2.4) are collected from Siler-Evans et al. (2011), Giaccone and
Canova (2009), and Galanti and Massardo (2011).
We consider microturbines, small-scale gas turbines with capacity size less than 1000
kW (Pipattanasomporn, 2005), without heat exchangers (MT) and microturbines with
heat exchangers (MT-HX) with dierent capacity sizes. While an MT has lower total
eciency than an MT-HX, MTs cost less and have been commercially available over a
longer period; therefore, they are often considered rst for small-scale generation invest-
ment (McDonald, 2000; Zhu et al., 2002; Nascimento et al., 2008). Other parameters,
including electricity and heat loads, the CO2 tax, the risk-free interest rate, and the con-
dence level for the CVaR, are specied in Table 2.5. Note that the tax on CO2 emissions
and operational and maintenance costs remain constant in real terms over the entire time
horizon. In each case, we examine dierent regimes in terms of the level of risk aversion
(B). With these numerical examples, we examine whether on-site generation investments
can be regarded as physical hedges to mitigate the microgrid's risk exposure and how
they interact with nancial hedges, such as electricity and gas futures. The optimisation
problems are implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) using the
basic open-source nonlinear mixed integer programming (BONMIN) solver on a desktop
with an Intel Core i7 2.79GHz CPU and 8GB RAM. The running times range from 40 to
280 minutes.
29Table 2.3: Dierent Cases of Running the Microgrid
Case Electricity
futures
Gas
futures
DER
investment
1 - No hedges
2 - Electricity futures only X
3 - Gas futures only X
4 - Both futures X X
5 - Physical hedges X
6 - Physical hedges with
electricity futures X X
7 - Physical hedges with
gas futures X X
8 - Physical hedges with
both electricity and gas fu-
tures
X X X
Table 2.4: Available Technologies of Microturbines (MT) with and without Heat Ex-
changer (HX)
Technology
index (i)
Type of
generation unit
Capacity  
Ke
i(kWe)
 Electrical
conversion
eciency
(Ee
i)
Total eciency of
producing
electricity and
useful thermal
energy (Ee+EeEh)
Total
investment
cost (Me)
1 MT-small-1 200 30% 30% 0.20
2 MT-small-2 400 30% 30% 0.40
3 MT-medium 600 30% 30% 0.60
4 MT-HX-small-1 200 27% 78% 0.27
5 MT-HX-small-2 400 27% 78% 0.54
6 MT-HX-medium 600 35% 88% 0.77
Table 2.5: Microgrid Parameters and CO2 Tax
Length of main period (Ho) 2 a (17520 h)
Length of subperiod (Hq) 0.25 a (2190 h)
Electricity demand (De) 1 MWe
Heat demand (Dh) 1.5 MW
CO2 emissions tax (Lc) e21/ton
Operational and maintenance cost (V e) e2/MWh
Risk-free annual interest rate (r) 1%
Condence level for the CVaR (A) 95%
2.4.2 Overview of Insights
Our ndings conrm that on-site generation with CHP reduces both expected energy
costs and CO2 emissions compared to cases with no on-site investment. In addition, the
30results indicate that on-site generation can hedge against volatile electricity prices, even
if on-site generation has low eciency or if the spread between electricity and gas prices
decreases. Finally, we show that on-site generation as a physical hedge can be substituted
with or complemented by nancial hedges. The main results for a risk-neutral micro-
grid (B = 0) across dierent cases, with and without the possibility of CHP investment,
are summarised in Table 2.6. Table 2.7 presents the same results for a maximally risk-
averse (B = 1) microgrid, i.e., with large values of B for which the CVaR reaches its
minimum. Note that, due to no-arbitrage futures pricing, i.e., price of futures cannot
be lower than expected spot prices for the corresponding period, futures purchases are
always zero in the risk-neutral regime. Table 2.8 shows how a lower gas spark spread,
the dierence between the price of electricity and the cost of producing electricity using
a central gas-red power plant, aects the microgrid's investment decision. These results
are obtained either by increasing the gas spot price by 20% and 50%, or by decreasing
the electricity spot price by 16% and 33% compared to the original prices in each scenario.
Table 2.6: Results in a Risk-Neutral Regime (B = 0)
Case Expected
Cost
(Me)
CVaR
(Me)
Installed
Capacity
(kWe)
Expected
CO2
emissions
(kiloton)
Eciency
of the
microgrid
Cases 1{4 and
Cases 5{8 w/o CHP 7.59 12.83 0 59.19 72.2%
Cases 5{8 w/ CHP 7.02 10.69 800 49.14 79.0%
Insight 1: CHP microturbines reduce the expected cost compared to purchas-
ing electricity from the market or generating electricity without heat recovery.
From Table 2.6, the installation of CHP in Cases 5{8-w/ CHP leads to a signicant
decrease in expected cost compared to Cases 1{4 and Cases 5{8-w/o CHP. Over the
eight-year period, the reduction in expected cost with CHP is e0.58M. Furthermore,
compared to Cases 1{4, the overall eciency of the microgrid increases in Cases 5{8-w/
CHP. Note that the benchmark for eciency is relatively high, as signicant proportions
of Germany's electricity are generated using nuclear power and renewable energy sources,
15.4% and 24.1%, respectively 2. Nevertheless, this modest increase in eciency in Cases
5{8-w/ CHP translates into a signicant decrease in CO2 emissions over the eight-year
period. It is equivalent to a 2.3% annual rate of decline over the same period, which is
signicantly larger than the 0.5% annual decrease recorded over the last eight-year period
in Germany. This result provides support for German CHP laws, which aim to promote
2Statistisches Bundesamt. Available: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/ImFokus/Energie/Kernenergie.html
31CHP installation in order to reach the 2020 targets.
Insight 2: On-site generation reduces the microgrid's risk exposure compared
to purchasing electricity from the spot market.
The CVaR of the microgrid can be diminished by decreasing either its expected cost or
the volatility of its running cost. The microgrid's CVaR is the highest when it meets
all of its electricity demand by purchasing from the spot market and uses the boiler for
heating, also purchasing all of its gas from the spot market. When CHP is installed in
Case 5-w/ CHP, both under risk-neutral and risk-averse regimes (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7),
the microgrid's CVaR decreases by e2.14M compared to Case 1. As the dierence be-
tween the expected cost in Case 5-w/ CHP and Case 1 is e0.58M, the remaining part of
the CVaR reduction, e1.57M, is due only to the lower volatility of the cost of running
the microgrid. Thus, the majority of the reduction in the CVaR arises from swapping
electricity spot purchases for gas spot purchases using CHP. The CVaR is reduced the
same way in Cases 5{8-w/o CHP, but the microgrid invests in on-site generation only
under risk-averse regimes. Since the MT w/o HX has low eciency, it cannot reduce the
expected cost; however, it still can reduce the microgrid's CVaR by using gas spot with
low volatility when the electricity price peaks.
Table 2.7: Results in a Risk-Averse Regime (B = 1)
Case Expected
Cost
(Me)
CVaR
(Me)
Installed
Capacity
(kWe)
Electricity
futuresa
Gas
futures
for
boiler b
Gas
futures
for MT c
Expected
CO2
emissions
(kt)
Eciency
of the
microgrid
1 7.59 12.83 0 0% 0% 0% 59.19 72.2%
2 7.70 12.02 0 9.0% 0% 0% 59.19 72.2%
3 7.62 12.63 0 0% 10.7% 0% 59.19 72.2%
4 7.69 11.97 0 7.0% 3.8% 0% 59.19 72.2%
5-w/ CHP 7.02 10.69 800 0% 0% 0% 49.14 79.0%
6-w/ CHP 7.03 10.63 800 1.1% 0% 0% 49.14 79.0%
7-w/ CHP 7.06 10.48 800 0% 1.7% 3.0% 48.96 79.2%
8-w/ CHP 7.07 10.44 800 0.7% 1.6% 3.1% 48.96 79.2%
5-w/o CHP 7.88 12.30 800 0% 0% 0% 60.86 68.1%
6-w/o CHP 7.80 11.96 400 6.7% 0% 0% 60.02 70.0%
7-w/o CHP 7.91 12.06 800 0% 8.2% 0.4% 60.87 68.0%
8-w/o CHP 8.10 11.82 600 5.6% 9.2% 0.7% 61.20 68.3%
a Fraction of electricity consumption supplied from electricity futures
b Fraction of heat consumption from boiler supplied from gas futures
c Fraction of electricity consumption supplied from gas futures
32Insight 3: CHP facilitates risk management even when the expected gas spark
spread is negative.
When the dierence between electricity and gas spot prices diminishes substantially and
the gas spark spread becomes negative, most gas-red power plants stop operating. As
CHP is more ecient than large power plants, a risk-neutral microgrid in Case 5-w/ CHP
invests in on-site generation if the negative expected gas spark spread is the result of in-
creasing gas prices (see Table 2.8). However, if the negative gas spark spread is due to low
electricity prices, then continuous on-site generation with CHP also becomes uneconomi-
cal, and a risk-neutral microgrid is better o with purchasing all electricity from the spot
market. Nevertheless, a risk-averse microgrid still invests in a CHP unit as it can hedge
against electricity price volatility and decreases the microgrid's CVaR (see Table 2.8).
These ndings indicate that on-site generation, as a physical hedge, represents additional
value for risk-averse consumers, since, similarly to swaptions (Hull, 2012), it gives the mi-
crogrid an option to swap electricity price for gas prices. Thus, even under a decreasing
expected spark spread, on-site generation with CHP is an ecient risk management tool
for consumers exposed to volatile electricity prices.
Table 2.8: Installed On-Site Generation in Case-5-w/ CHP for Dierent Spark Spreads
Average ratio
of electricity
and gas spot
pricesa
Gas spark
spreadb
(e/MWh)
Installed
capacity at
B = 0
(kWe)
Installed
capacity at
B = 1
(kWe)
Original prices 3.0 11.46 800 800
Increasing gas prices
2.5 2.1 800 800
2.0 -13.3 600 600
Decreasing electricity prices
2.5 2.2 600 600
2.0 -8.3 0 600
a Average ratio of electricity and gas spot prices =
X
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1 2ST
1
QsT
1
X
s22S2
Qs2
1
TM
X
t2T
X
m2M
(
Pe
st
1;s2;m
P
g
st
1;s2;m
)
b Spark spread =
X
sT
1 2 ST
1
QsT
1
X
s22S2
Qs2
1
TM
X
t2T
X
m2M
(Pe
st
1;s2;m  
P
g
st
1;s2;m
Ee )
where Ee=50.00% by convention (CDC Climate Research - Methodology, 2013)
Insight 4: Electricity futures and on-site generation are substitutes.
As consumers also have the possibility to hedge against price risk via the nancial markets,
it is important to assess how the availability of electricity futures aects the microgrid's
investment decisions in on-site generation. Comparing the cases with risk-averse regimes,
Case 2 and Case 6-w/ CHP in Table 2.7, the proportion of electricity futures purchased
decreases signicantly when CHP is present. Since CHP generation is very ecient, it can
decrease CVaR at a lower cost by producing energy on-site whenever the spot electricity
33price peaks. Therefore, electricity futures have less scope for CVaR reduction and are
used very rarely. On the other hand, when only the less ecient MT without HX can be
installed, the availability of electricity futures decreases the need for on-site generation.
This is why the installed capacity drops to 400 kWe in Case 6-w/o CHP compared to 800
kWe in Case 5-w/o CHP. Consequently, these ndings show that electricity futures and
on-site generation are substitutes.
Insight 5: Gas futures and on-site generation are complements.
The microgrid can purchase gas futures for on-site generation or for the boiler. Since
the gas spot price has low volatility, gas futures for the boiler can reduce the CVaR only
slightly. Nevertheless, as the boiler is more ecient than MT w/o HX, these purchases as-
sist on-site investment in Case 8-w/o CHP, where the installed capacity is 200 kWe higher
compared to Case 7-w/o CHP, when only electricity futures are available (see Table 2.7).
Gas futures for on-site generation would increase the running cost of the microgrid in
Case 8-w/o CHP; however, the microgrid can mitigate some of the price volatility of spot
gas for the MT by purchasing gas futures for the more ecient boiler. On the other
hand, when CHP is installed, the microgrid purchases most of the gas futures for the MT,
thereby further reducing the microgrid's exposure to electricity price volatility. While
the share of gas futures in electricity generation is still relatively small, i.e., 3.0% and
3.1% in Cases 7 and 8-w/ CHP, respectively, they contribute signicantly to the CVaR
reduction of the microgrid. For example, in Case 7-w/ CHP, if the microgrid could not
use gas futures for MT, then the CVaR would increase by e0.11M. Therefore, while the
combined share of gas futures purchases for the MT and for the boiler are the lowest in
Cases w/ CHP, gas futures become more cost-eective in reducing CVaR when CHP is
present.
Summary
According to the European Cogeneration Review (2013), the biggest obstacles to CHP
adoption in Germany are risk aversion and an unfavourable gas spark spread. This is why
it is important to note that, in fact, on-site generation can work as a physical hedge by
reducing the consumers' CVaR, which is not captured by NPV and real options analyses.
Under a positive gas spark spread, even cheaper but less-ecient technologies, i.e., mi-
croturbines without heat exchangers, can limit risk exposure to peaking electricity prices.
Furthermore, conforming to the results of Maribu and Fleten (2008), we nd that con-
sumers can decrease their expected cost by investing in CHP, which can also function as an
ecient hedge in case of a signicant reduction in the average gas spark spread. However,
a liquid electricity futures market might have an adverse eect on on-site generation.
34Indeed, the availability of electricity futures can decrease the willingness of risk-averse
consumers to invest in technologies w/o CHP since they can be as eective in reducing
CVaR as on-site generation without heat recovery. By contrast, the availability of gas
futures can contribute to more investment in on-site generation, as shown in Cases 7-w/
and w/o CHP. While nancial hedges play an important role in risk management, from
a social point of view, CHP investments provide more benets in terms of lower CO2
emissions and more reliable electricity supply. Thus, policies aecting electricity and gas
markets can also inuence progress towards the 2020 CHP goals in Germany. To exam-
ine how the interaction between physical and nancial hedges aect on-site generation
investment, we investigate each type of hedge separately and perform sensitivity analyses
in terms of electricity price volatility as well as and electricity and gas price correlation.
2.4.3 Insights without On-Site Generation
In order to understand better the interaction between nancial and physical hedges, we
rst examine the eectiveness of nancial hedging alone. To do so, we focus on the
ecient frontier for Cases 1{4. Such frontiers are delimited by varying the B parameter
in order to make determinations about the mean-risk tradeo. The rate of tradeo can be
analysed through comparing the slope of the mean-risk ecient frontier, from which we
can derive the amount of CVaR reduction per e1 increase in the expected cost. Fig. 2.10
shows the ecient frontier for Cases 1{4. The largest decrease in CVaR is between B = 0
and B = 0:35. At this level of risk aversion, gas futures are more ecient than electricity
futures at reducing CVaR, i.e., a e1 increase in expected cost with gas futures leads to
larger CVaR reduction, but the eect of electricity futures is larger, i.e., they reduce the
CVaR by e0.78M compared to e0.19M with gas futures. This is because the electricity
spot price is more volatile than the gas spot price, which means that electricity futures
can reduce CVaR to a larger extent, even though their risk premium is higher (Table 2.1).
Hence, a microgrid with only nancial hedges can reduce its CVaR mostly by purchasing
electricity futures.
35Figure 2.10: Ecient Frontiers for Cases 1{4
2.4.4 Insights with MT without Heat Recovery
To further elaborate on the main insights, we also examine the mean-risk tradeo of cases
without CHP. Compared to the nancial hedges in Cases 2{4, MT w/o HX on its own
is less eective. The maximum CVaR reduction in Case 5-w/o CHP is 4%, compared to
7% with nancial hedges, and it is reached at a much higher cost. The reason for this is
that the MT w/o HX has a low electrical conversion rate, which can be used only in a
few scenarios, but its capital cost increases the microgrid's expenditure in each scenario.
Conversely, the microgrid can decide in every main period whether to enter into futures
contracts, which makes nancial hedges less burdensome on the expected cost.
Insight 2-w/o CHP: Less ecient on-site generation can also reduce the mi-
crogrid's risk exposure.
From the results presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, we conclude that microturbines with-
out heat exchangers are always inferior to CHP, but they still can function as a physical
hedge. In the risk-neutral regime (B = 0), the microgrid does not install any on-site
generation in cases w/o CHP. Nevertheless, in risk-averse regimes (B > 0), the microgrid
installs microturbines whenever they are available. Furthermore, the more risk averse the
microgrid becomes, the more generation capacity it installs (Fig. 2.11). As above, the
reason for this is that the volatility of the gas spot price is lower than that of the elec-
tricity spot price. The microgrid can, therefore, decrease its CVaR by installing on-site
generation and swapping the volatile electricity spot price for the less volatile gas spot
36price. For example, in Case 5-w/o CHP at B = 0:37, the microgrid invests in 200 kWe
of on-site generation (Fig. 2.12). Due to its low eciency, the microturbine supplies only
3.6% of the electricity load but has the potential to supply 20%. Thus, even though the
microturbine lies mostly idle, it still enables the microgrid to avoid peaking electricity
prices, thereby signicantly decreasing its CVaR.
Insight 4-w/o CHP: The degree of the substitution eect between electricity
futures and on-site generation is determined by the level of risk aversion.
Figs. 2.11 and 2.12 show that the microgrid invests in less on-site generation capacity
when electricity futures are available. This indicates that electricity futures and on-site
generation are substitutes in the sense that increasing the purchases of electricity futures
reduces the scope of on-site generation for CVaR reduction. Conversely, lowering the
risk premium for electricity futures (decreasing the investment cost of MT) reduces the
risk-averse demand for on-site generation (electricity futures). However, this substitution
eect is asymmetric with the cross-price elasticity depending on the level of risk aversion.
At B = 100, a one percentage point decrease in the risk premium for electricity futures
leads to lower on-site generation investment. On the other hand, at the same level of
risk-aversion, only a 20% decrease in the investment cost would result in more on-site
generation investment and less futures purchases. At a lower level of risk aversion, B = 1,
when the microgrid installs the 200 kWe MT, a 14% decrease in the price of MT is sucient
to increase the demand for on-site generation to 400 kWe, while only a 12% decrease in
the risk premium would result in no on-site investment and increased electricity futures
purchases. The substitution eect between electricity futures and on-site generation is
asymmetric because their eects on CVaR reduction are also asymmetric. Investing in
on-site generation gives the option to the microgrid to swap gas spot prices for electricity
prices. With on-site generation with low eciency, the spread between gas and electricity
spot prices has to be suciently large so that the CVaR reduction from on-site generation
remains larger than the increase in the expected cost. As such a high price spread occurs
infrequently, the 400 kWe MT remains idle predominantly, while the 200 kWe MT is
sucient most of the time. This is why the substitution eect of electricity futures is
larger when the 400 kWe MT is installed. Thus, in terms of CVaR reduction, MT w/o
HX is the most competitive against nancial futures if installed in small capacity.
Insight 5-w/o CHP: The complementary eect between gas futures and on-
site investment depends on the level of risk aversion.
At B = 100 in Case 8-w/o CHP, a two percentage point decrease in the risk premium
for gas futures increases the demand for on-site generation from 600 kWe to 800 kWe.
At the same level of risk aversion, a 10% decrease in the investment cost increases the
37on-site investment to 800 kWe and, hence, increases the demand for gas futures for boiler
from 5.1% to 6.9% of the heat demand. Thus, gas futures have a larger impact when the
marginal CVaR reduction of on-site investment is small, which in Case 8-w/o is also due
to the presence of electricity futures, which are substitutes to on-site generation. This is
why in Case 7-w/o CHP, when electricity futures are not available, the marginal eect
of on-site generation on CVaR reduction increases and the role of gas futures becomes
more limited. At the risk-aversion levels specied on Fig. 2.11, a decrease in the risk
premium for gas futures does not lead to more investment. On the other hand, a decrease
in the investment cost leads to more investment, which in turn leads to more gas futures
purchases. Therefore, in Case 7-w/o CHP, on-site generation is a better complement as
it has a stronger eect on gas futures purchases than gas futures purchases have on the
investment decision. Nevertheless, the presence of gas futures still aects the investment
decision, as indicated by the mean-risk ecient frontiers of Cases 5 and 7-w/o CHP. When
gas futures are present, in Case 7-w/o CHP, investment decisions are triggered at lower
B compared to Case 5. For example, the microgrid invests in 400 kWe at B = 0:35 when
gas futures are available and at B = 0:50 when gas futures cannot be purchased.
Figure 2.11: Ecient Frontiers for Cases 5{8 w/o CHP with Installed Capacity Indicated
38Figure 2.12: Ecient Frontiers for Cases 5{8 w/o CHP with Spot and Futures Purchases
Indicated
2.4.5 Insights with CHP
Having demonstrated the eectiveness of CHP in decreasing the microgrid's expected
cost, we now further examine Cases 5{8-w/ CHP by focusing on the CHP's role in risk
management. As shown in Fig. 2.13, Cases 5{8-w/ CHP have much lower expected cost
and CVaR than Case 1. Furthermore, the installed generation capacity is the same in all
risk-neutral and risk-averse regimes. As the CHP is ecient, the microgrid uses on-site
generation to decrease its expected cost in the risk-neutral regime whenever the electricity
price peaks. Thus, there is no scope for further CVaR reduction by swapping electricity
for gas and, hence, the microgrid does not install more capacity in risk-averse regimes.
Insight 4-w/ CHP: The substitution eect of electricity futures for on-site
generation is much weaker with CHP in comparison with MT w/o HX.
While the shares of both electricity and gas futures are lower compared to Cases 5{8-w/o
CHP, the decrease in the use of electricity futures is larger than that of gas futures (see
Case 8-w/ CHP in Fig. 2.14 and Case 8-w/o CHP in Fig. 2.12). When the installed
generation capacity cannot be used economically, the electricity spot price is low with
low volatility; therefore, the microgrid purchases electricity futures at only those main
scenario nodes when the average gas spot price is relatively high and the electricity spot
price is still volatile. As this happens rarely, the share of electricity futures is much lower
than in cases w/o CHP. This indicates that MT w/ HX and electricity futures are sub-
39stitutes. Since the microgrid invests in CHP in the risk-neutral regime, the substitution
eect between on-site generation and electricity futures is much smaller for the risk-averse
microgrid. In Case 6-w/ CHP at B = 100, only a 9 % decrease in the risk premium for
electricity futures leads to 200 kWe less on-site investment. In the same case, the in-
vestment cost of MTs w/ HX needs to increase by 40% to trigger additional electricity
futures purchases. As the share of electricity purchases is low, increased risk premiums
for electricity futures cannot aect the investment decision. Thus, investment in CHP is
relatively insensitive to large changes in the electricity futures market.
Insight 5-w/ CHP: Gas futures for the boiler are substitutes, while gas futures
for MT are complements for CHP investment.
The eect of gas futures on the use of on-site generation is somewhat ambiguous. On the
one hand, the use of on-site generation increases the value of gas futures for MT; thus, gas
futures and on-site generation are complements. On the other hand, gas futures might
decrease the risk-averse demand for CHP as they can reduce the CVaR when used with
the boiler. While in cases w/o CHP the boiler was operated independently of the MT,
in cases w/ CHP, the microgrid does not run the boiler and the CHP at full capacity at
the same time as this would generate heat waste. This is why gas futures for boiler and
on-site generation with CHP can be substitutes. In Case 7-w/ CHP at B = 100, a change
in the risk premium for gas futures does not aect the investment decision. However,
when the investment cost increases, the demand for gas futures for MT decreases, while
the demand for gas futures for boiler increases. The same interaction can be observed
when we run Case 8-w/ CHP but without gas futures for MT. In the most risk-averse
regime, the microgrid decreases its investment to 600 kWe and increases its electricity
futures and gas futures for boiler purchases. Comparing the eects of electricity and gas
futures, in Case 8-w/ CHP, a 9% in the risk premium of electricity futures results in a 200
kWe decrease in on-site investment. However, if this is accompanied by a 1% decrease
in the premium of gas futures, then the microgrid maintains its 800 kWe investment.
Thus, gas futures and on-site generation are complements as the substitution eect of gas
futures for the boiler is dominated by the complementary eect of gas futures for MT in
most cases. The substitution eect of gas futures eclipses the complementary eect only
when the economics of CHP deteriorate signicantly. For example, in Case 8-w/ CHP at
B = 100, if the cost of CHP increases by 40%, then the microgrid invests in less on-site
generation; however, if gas futures for the boiler were not available, then it would still
invest in 800 kWe CHP. Thus, the availability of gas futures results in more investment
in CHP under current market conditions.
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Figure 2.14: Ecient Frontiers for Cases 5{8 w/ CHP with Spot and Futures Purchases
with B = 0, B = 1, and B = 100
2.4.6 Sensitivity Analysis
The increasing share of renewable generation has had a profound eect on the German en-
ergy markets. Ketterer (2014) shows that intermittent generation increases the wholesale
electricity price. Furthermore, Paraschiv et al. (2014) nd that the sensitivity of electric-
ity price to gas price decreases over time due to the promotion of renewable energies. As
41these trends are expected to continue, we carry out sensitivity analyses in terms of in-
creased electricity price volatility as well as gas and electricity price correlation. First, we
run the optimisation problem with long-term (e
Y) and short-term (e
Q) electricity price
volatility increased by 10%. Second, we run the optimisation problem with the long-
and short-term correlation of electricity and gas prices halved, i.e., lowering them from
Y = 0:80 and Q = 0:83 to Y = 0:40 and Q = 0:42, respectively.
Insight 6: With higher electricity price volatility, the value of on-site genera-
tion as physical hedges increases compared to nancial hedges.
Fig. 2.16 illustrates the ecient frontiers for Cases 5{8-w/o CHP. In all cases, the mi-
crogrid invests in 1000 kWe on-site generation in the risk-neutral regime, compared to
no investment with the original electricity price volatility (Fig. 2.11). Again, the aver-
age share of on-site electricity generation is small (less than 25%). However, when the
electricity price peaks, the microturbine works at full capacity. This way, the microgrid
can decrease its expected cost and CVaR by 3% and 9%, respectively, compared to Cases
1{4 in the risk-neutral regime. This is larger than the CVaR reduction produced by the
combined use of electricity and gas futures in Case 4 (Fig. 2.15). Even with volatile spot
prices, the CVaR-reducing potential of nancial hedges diminishes whenever spot prices
exhibit large drops. This, however, does not aect negatively the capacity investment de-
cisions, as the microgrid can purchase electricity from the spot market if prices decrease,
while using on-site generation to hedge against price jumps.
Figure 2.15: Ecient Frontiers for Cases 1{4 with B = 0, B = 0:35, B = 1, and B = 10
for Increased Electricity Price Volatility
42Figure 2.16: Ecient Frontiers for Cases 5{8 w/o CHP with B = 0, B = 0:35, B = 1,
and B = 10 for Increased Electricity Price Volatility
The CVaR reduction of the microgrid is even larger with CHP (Fig. 2.17). The microgrid
invests in 1000 kWe capacity in risk-neutral regimes in Cases 5{8 w/ CHP and in risk-
averse regimes in Cases 6{8. Investing in 1000 kWe capacity means that, in some cases,
the microgrid generates more heat from heat recovery than it requires. However, as the
gap between electricity and gas spot price volatilities widens, the value of the option to
swap electricity at a higher spot price for gas at a lower price substantially increases.
Figure 2.17: Ecient Frontiers for Cases 5{8 w/ CHP with B = 0, B = 1, and B = 10
for Increased Electricity Price Volatility
43Insight 7: Under lower levels of electricity and gas price correlations, on-site
generation works less eciently as a physical hedge, but the complementary
eect of gas futures increases.
In Cases 5, 6, and 8-w/ CHP, the risk-averse microgrid decreases the installed capacity
to 800 kWe from the risk-neutral investment level of 1000 kWe (Fig. 2.18). In the
risk-neutral regime, compared to the same cases with the original correlation rates, the
microgrid requires a higher installed capacity in order to generate more electricity when
the price dierence is sucient to recover the investment cost. However, a more risk-averse
microgrid installs less capacity, as in scenarios with high gas prices and low electricity
prices the microgrid cannot operate its CHP. In Case 7-w/ CHP, when gas futures are
available, the risk-averse microgrid does not need to decrease its investment at B = 1
because it can use gas futures to hedge against uncorrelated volatile gas spot prices.
However, in the most risk-averse regime (B = 10), even the presence of gas futures is
not enough to maintain a higher investment level. Nevertheless, if the risk premium
for gas futures decreases by 1%, then even in the most risk-averse regime the microgrid
maintains its 1000 kWe capacity investment. This again indicates that gas futures and
on-site generation interact complementarily. In this case, the complementary eect of
gas futures is larger compared to the cases with original correlation or increased price
volatility, when CHP can reduce the CVaR signicantly on its own.
Figure 2.18: Ecient Frontiers for Cases 5{8 w/ CHP with B = 0, B = 0:35, B = 1, and
B = 10 for Decreased Correlation of Electricity and Gas Spot Prices
442.5 Conclusions
Deregulation has introduced new challenges and opportunities within the energy sector.
On the one hand, consumers face uncertain electricity and gas prices, which signicantly
increases their risk exposure. On the other hand, consumers can now invest in on-site
generation or use futures to hedge against increased price risk. While nancial hedges
play an increasingly important role in the energy markets, investment in new technologies
provides more social benets, such as higher energy eciency and lower CO2 emissions,
as shown in Siddiqui et al. (2005). Still, despite the ongoing eorts of policymakers in
Germany to support CHP implementation (Kraft-W arme-Kopplungs-Gesetz, 2002, 2008,
2012), the investment rate is lagging behind the desired targets.
Possible explanations for this are volatile gas spark spreads and risk aversion among
smaller potential investors. Indeed, managing the risk from such ventures requires more
sophisticated decision support. Using stochastic programming, we show that even if the
gas spark spread decreases or the correlation between gas and electricity prices deterio-
rates in Germany, then on-site generation still remains an eective physical hedge against
electricity price volatility, which is likely to increase due to the rising share of intermittent
generation. Since conventional decision-making frameworks do not take into account risk
aversion, decision makers using these techniques might overlook the signicant value of
CHP as physical hedge. As CHP is more energy ecient than purchasing electricity from
the grid and using a gas-red boiler for heat production, it is also associated with lower
CO2 emissions and can help to achieve the 2020 goals set by the EU. The microgrid's
CVaR can be further decreased by combining on-site generation with electricity and gas
futures. While we demonstrate that electricity futures and on-site generation are sub-
stitutes, the availability of electricity futures impede investments mostly in technologies
without CHP. Microturbines with heat recovery are more ecient hedges as they can
swap the high volatility of the electricity price for the low volatility of the gas spot price.
Consequently, the microgrid is not exposed to peaks in electricity price when the use of
nancial futures would be a more costly alternative.
Intriguingly, we show that gas futures and on-site generation can complement each
other, as a microgrid is more likely to install additional generation capacity when gas
futures are available. In fact, the availability of gas futures can neutralise the substitu-
tion eect of electricity futures, thereby contributing to higher investment. Nevertheless,
the interaction between nancial and physical hedges depends on both the level of risk
aversion of the microgrid and on the behavior of the underlying electricity and gas prices.
Under increased electricity price volatility, on-site generation becomes more attractive,
and even the installation of a less ecient microturbine without heat recovery can reduce
expected cost. In contrast, when the correlation between electricity and gas spot prices
is halved, on-site generation works less eciently as a physical hedge on its own and the
complementary eect of gas futures increases.
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Optimal Operation of Combined
Heat and Power under Uncertainty
and Risk Aversion
3.1 Introduction
Apart from the investment decision, large consumers need to consider also their medium-
term operational risk management problem. In deregulated electricity industries, a con-
sumer has the opportunity to meet its electricity and gas demand by purchasing from the
spot and futures markets or through on-site generation. Recently, trade in both medium-
term gas and electricity futures has increased (EEX Press Release, 2014) and now the
potential consumers can choose from dierent futures contracts in terms of load prole
and the length of the contract. While purchasing futures contracts can reduce the risk
associated with the volatility of spot prices, it can also mean higher operational costs
because of risk premia of futures contracts. Another option is on-site generation, which
requires more sophisticated decision support and is exposed to the gas price volatility.
Similarly, consumers relying on purchases from wholesale electricity markets can benet
from large price drops in countries with high share of intermittent generation but are
exposed to increasing price volatility (Woo et al., 2011). Thus, there are a lot of tradeos
to consider that may not be evaluated adequately via conventional deterministic models.
Addressing this problem can encourage on-site investment, which in turn can lead to
lower CO2 emissions compared to purchasing electricity from the main grid (Siddiqui et
al., 2005). For the aforementioned reasons, Germany has adopted three CHP laws to sup-
port investment into small- and large-scale CHP (Kraft-W arme-Kopplungs-Gesetz, 2002,
2008, 2012). However, the targets regarding the higher share of cogeneration have not yet
been achieved (Streckiene et al., 2009).
Some of the possible reasons for lower than expected investment in CHP are the
46electricity and gas price uncertainties in deregulated industries (European Cogeneration
Review - Germany, 2013). Koller et al. (2012) argue that middle level-managers show
strong bias against risk as a result of awed reward systems within companies. They
nd that lead managers are often unwilling to tolerate uncertainty even when a project's
potential earnings far outweigh its potential losses.
In order to examine the risk that large consumers face, we formulate a multi-stage,
mean-risk optimisation model for the medium-term operational risk management of a
microgrid with installed CHP. Our objective is to gain insights into managing risk in a
microgrid over a one-month period using futures contracts and on-site generation. We as-
sume uncertain electricity and gas spot prices and the availability of monthly and weekly
electricity futures and monthly gas futures. The microgrid needs to meet its electricity
demand by either purchasing electricity from the markets or through on-site generation.
In addition, the microgrid needs to satisfy its heat loads by using either a boiler or heat
recovery. Thus, compared to the previous chapter which considered quarterly average
spot prices and yearly futures contracts, we provide a more realistic description of oper-
ational hedging strategies for a large consumer. We nd that the use of CHP not only
lowers the microgrid's expected running cost signicantly but also reduces its risk expo-
sure compared to on-site generation without heat recovery or to purchasing all electricity
from the main grid. We also nd that the availability of monthly gas futures increases
on-site generation with CHP, thus indicating that CHP and gas futures are complements.
3.2 Literature Review
Research interest in consumer energy procurement has steadily grown over the last two
decades. Studies with deterministic models demonstrate that consumers participating
in the electricity market can reduce their costs signicantly. Through a case study, Ta-
lati and Bednarz (1998) present dierent methodologies for large industrial customers to
manage their electricity purchases in a competitive power industry. They suggest that
future regulatory changes are likely to trigger higher electricity pool prices, which might
justify investments in cogeneration. Kirschen (2003) considers some aspects of the elec-
tricity market from the perspective of a large consumer. Specically, he points out that
electricity markets could benet consumers, but this requires adoption of more sophis-
ticated decision support. In this vein, Conejo et al. (2005) consider a large consumer
that procures its electricity demand from both pool and bilateral transactions, or through
operating a self-production unit. They provide a procedure that, provided all the re-
quired information is available, allows a large consumer to decide optimally its mix of
purchases from dierent electricity sources. Siddiqui et al. (2005) compare the economic
benet of installing dierent types of DG (reciprocating engines with or without heat
recovery and photovoltaic panels) at a hypothetical microgrid that supplies heat, cooling,
47and electricity to a commercial building using the DER-CAM. Using mixed-integer linear
programming (MILP), they nd that investing in gas-red CHP turbines leads to the
lowest energy cost and also reduces CO2 emissions.
Studies incorporating uncertain energy prices also demonstrate the economic benet
of procurement management and on-site generation. Yan and Yan (2000) discuss the
demand-side bidding and purchase allocation in day-ahead and real-time markets. By us-
ing dynamic programming, they nd an eective energy purchase strategy that results in
lower procurement cost. The same problem is addressed by Liu and Guan (2003) but they
also consider the price volatility by including the variance of the cost of purchase in the
objective function. They provide an analytical solution to optimal demand bids. Conejo
and Carri on (2006) approach the same problem as Conejo et al. (2005), but they consider
pool price volatility as well. By applying a mean-variance methodology, they minimise
the procurement cost of a large consumer while limiting the risk of its cost variability.
Siddiqui and Marnay (2008) also use real options to evaluate the investment decision of
a hypothetical California-based microgrid with gas-red DG. They study separately the
eect of stochastic long-term gas prices, operational exibility (i.e., the option of islanding
from the macrogrid), and uncertain electricity prices. Siddiqui and Marnay (2008) nd
that both high electricity price volatility and operational exibility increase the value of
the project.
While Conejo and Carri on (2006) and Siddiqui and Marnay (2008) take into account
market uncertainties, they do not address the operational risk of a consumer. One of the
main mathematical tools used to model decision making under uncertainty is stochas-
tic programming. Kettunen et al. (2010) use stochastic programming to examine the
optimal operation of an electricity retailer that faces price and demand uncertainties.
Pineda (2008) models the decision problem of a power producer company with stochastic
electricity spot prices and uncertain availability of the generating units. Carri on et al.
(2007) consider the same procurement problem as Conejo et al. (2005) and Conejo and
Carri on (2006) but via stochastic programming. They nd that as risk aversion increases,
the consumer purchases less electricity from the spot market relying more on monthly
contracts while the share of on-site generation only slightly decreases.
Our research contributes to the existing literature as follows. Similarly to Carri on et
al. (2007), we examine a large consumer, but we also study the use of CHP in addition to
a microturbine without heat recovery. Furthermore, we assume that both electricity and
gas spot prices are uncertain and futures prices are marked-to-market in every period.
Similarly to our optimal DER selection problem, we provide insights into the interaction
of nancial hedges and on-site generation, but we focus on a microgrid's risk management
in the medium term instead of its long-term investment decisions. We nd that on-site
generation with a CHP unit increases the demand for monthly gas futures signicantly
compared to on-site generation with an MT and a boiler unit. In addition, operating
48CHP can substitute entirely o-peak monthly and weekly base load electricity futures,
but it has less eect on monthly base load futures purchases.
3.3 Decision-Making Framework
3.3.1 Assumptions
We address the operation of a microgrid over a one-month time horizon that comprises
four weeks. Each week is subdivided into T time periods of equal duration. The microgrid
consists of a gas-red microturbine with heat recovery, a boiler unit, and deterministic
electricity and heat loads. The microgrid can purchase electricity from the spot market
and from the weekly and monthly futures markets. The monthly electricity futures have
either an o-peak load, a peak load, or a base load prole, while the weekly electricity
futures contracts can be purchased for base load and peak load periods. The microgrid
can also generate electricity using gas from the spot and monthly futures markets while
recovering waste heat. When the CHP unit is not in operation, the microgrid employs its
boiler unit to meet its heat demand using gas from the spot and monthly futures markets.
The microgrid's objective is to minimise the expected value of its procurement cost while
limiting its volatility through incorporating risk aversion measured by CVaR.
To reduce computational complexity, we approximate the true distribution of the
random electricity and gas prices by an approximation in the form of a ve-stage scenario
tree (Fig. 3.1) in which each non-root node corresponds to a state of the world spanning
one week. Each node of the tree represents a point at which decisions are taken based
on the realisation of the random parameters up to the stage of that node. Note that in
our nodal formulation the non-anticipativity constraints are incorporated implicitly, i.e.,
before the scenario tree branches, we do not know at which node we will be at the next
stage. A path in the tree from the root (i.e., rst-stage) node to a node at the last stage
represents a scenario.
The microgrid's decision sequence is as follows. At stage 1, the microgrid chooses
how many monthly and week-1 electricity and gas futures it purchases. At stage 2, the
microgrid observes the realised spot prices for week 1. Depending on how much electricity
and gas it purchased from the futures markets, it then decides, for each subperiod of week
1, how much electricity and gas to purchase on the spot markets, how much electricity to
produce on-site, and whether to meet the heat demand using the boiler or heat recovery.
While there are no monthly futures purchases at stages 2{5, the weekly futures and spot
decision-making procedure is repeated analogously for the remaining three weeks. Finally,
as this paper concerns only the operational decisions of a microgrid, we disregard capital
costs of the on-site generation units.
49Figure 3.1: Scenario Tree
3.3.2 Nomenclature
Sets and Indices
a(n): ancestor node of node n 2 N 1
C := fb;o;pg: set of futures contracts in terms of load prole, which can be either base
(b), o-peak (o), or peak load (p)
Dn: descendant nodes of node n 2 N
N: set of nodes in the scenario tree
N 1: subset of nodes excluding the root node in the scenario tree, i.e., N 1 := N n f1g
Ns: set of nodes that scenario s 2 S passes through
S: set of scenarios, i.e., s 2 S is a path from the root node (n = 1) to a node at the last
stage W + 1
T := f1;:::;Tg: set of time periods at each node n 2 N 1
50Tc: set of time periods with load prole c 2 C at each node n 2 N 1
^ T := f1;:::;T  Wg: auxiliary set of time periods for electricity spot price scenario
generation
~ T := f1;:::; T
2  Wg: auxiliary set of time periods for gas spot price scenario generation
W := f1;:::;W + 1g: set of stages
Random Parameters
F e
c;a(n): price of weekly electricity futures contracts of type c 2 C xed in node a(n),
n 2 N 1, for delivery in the coming week (e/MWhe)
P e
n;t: spot price of electricity at node n 2 N 1 in time period t 2 T (e/MWhe)
P
g
n;t: spot price of gas at node n 2 N 1 in time period t 2 T (e/MWh)
Fixed Parameters
e
^ t: error term of the ARIMA model for electricity spot prices in time period ^ t 2 ^ T
(e/MWhe)

g
~ t: error term of the dynamic regression model for gas spot prices in time period ~ t 2 ~ T
(e/MWh)
;k; k: parameters used in the dynamic regression model for gas spot prices, k 2 N
k;k;k;k: parameters used in the ARIMA model for electricity spot prices, k 2 N
e
m;c;e
w;c: risk premia of monthly and weekly electricity futures contracts of type c 2 C
g
m: risk premium of monthly gas futures contracts
e;g: standard deviations of the error term of the electricity and gas price processes
A: condence level for the CVaR
B: risk weight
Eb: boiler conversion eciency, i.e., volume of useful heat produced from one MWh of
natural gas (MWh/MWh)
Ee: electrical conversion eciency, i.e., volume of electricity produced from one MWh of
natural gas (MWhe/MWh)
Eh: heat-recovery rate from on-site generation, i.e., volume of useful heat captured while
producing one MWhe of electricity (MWh/MWhe)
De
w(n);t: electricity load in stage w(n) 2 W, n 2 N 1, and period t 2 T (MWe)
Dh
w(n);t: heat load in stage w(n) 2 W, n 2 N 1, and period t 2 T (MW)
Hc;w(n);t: length of energy delivery by a contract of type c 2 C in stage w(n) 2 W,
n 2 N 1, in period t 2 T (h)
Jw(n);t: length of time period t 2 T in stage w(n) 2 W, n 2 N 1 (h)
Kb: capacity of the boiler unit (MW)
Ke: capacity of electricity generation unit (MWe)
Le
c: price of monthly electricity futures contracts of type c 2 C (e/MWhe)
51Lg: price of monthly gas futures contracts (e/MWh)
^ P e
^ t : spot price of electricity in time period ^ t 2 ^ T used for electricity spot price scenario
generation; ^ P e
s;^ t for scenario s 2 S (e/MWhe)
~ P e
~ t : spot price of electricity in time period ~ t 2 ~ T used for gas spot price scenario genera-
tion; ~ P e
s;~ t for scenario s 2 S (e/MWhe)
~ P
g
~ t : spot price of gas in time period ~ t 2 ~ T used for gas spot price scenario generation;
~ P
g
s;~ t for scenario s 2 S (e/MWh)
qs: probability of scenario path s 2 S
w(n) 2 W: stage of node n 2 N
Decision Variables
s: cost of satisfying the electricity and heat loads in scenario path s 2 S (e)
s: auxiliary variable to estimate the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) in scenario path
s 2 S (e)
: VaR at condence level A (e)
xb
n;t: gas purchased from the spot market for boiler heat production in node n 2 N 1
during period t 2 T (MWh)
xe
n;t: electricity purchased on the spot market in node n 2 N 1 during period t 2 T
(MWhe)
x
g
n;t: gas purchased on the spot market for on-site electricity generation in node n 2 N 1
during period t 2 T (MWh)
ye
c;a(n): electricity delivered by weekly futures of type c 2 C in node n 2 N 1 (MWe)
zb: natural gas delivered by monthly futures for boiler heat production during the whole
month (MW)
ze
c: electricity delivered by monthly futures of type c 2 C during the whole month (MWe)
zg: natural gas delivered by monthly futures for on-site electricity generation during the
whole month (MW)
3.3.3 Model Formulation
Objective Function
The objective function in Eq. (3.1) minimises the sum of the expected value (rst term)
and a weighted CVaR of the cost of running the microgrid (second term:
minimise
X
s2S
qss + B

 +
1
1   A
X
s2S
qss

(3.1)
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Eqs. (3.2){(3.3) are necessary for calculating the CVaR of the cost of running the microgrid
up to the end of the time horizon, 8s 2 S:
s      s  0 (3.2)
s  0 (3.3)
Eq. (3.4) calculates the cost of running the microgrid in scenario s 2 S:
s =
X
n2Nsnf1g
X
t2T
X
c2C
(z
e
cL
e
cHc;w(n);t + y
e
c;a(n)F
e
a(n)Hc;w(n);t)
+ x
e
n;tP
e
n;t + (z
g + z
b)L
gJw(n);t + (x
g
n;t + x
b
n;t)P
g
n;t

(3.4)
Eqs. (3.5){(3.6) ensure that the electricity and heat demands are met at all time, 8n 2
N 1;8t 2 T :
x
e
n;t +
X
c2C
(y
e
c;a(n)Hc;w(n);t + z
e
cHc;w(n);t)
+ E
e(x
g
n;t + z
gJw(n);t)  D
e
w(n);t (3.5)
E
hE
e(x
g
n;t + z
gJw(n);t)
+ E
b(x
b
n;t + z
bJw(n);t)  D
h
w(n);t (3.6)
Eqs. (3.7){(3.8) ensure that the DER and boiler capacity limits are observed, 8n 2
N 1;8t 2 T :
E
e(x
g
n;t + z
gJw(n);t)  K
eJw(n);t (3.7)
E
b(x
b
n;t + z
bJw(n);t)  K
bJw(n);t (3.8)
Finally, all of the purchase decision variables must be non-negative, 8n 2 N 1;8t 2
T ;8c 2 C:
xe
n;t  0;x
g
n;t  0;xb
n;t  0;ye
c;a(n)  0;
ze
c  0;zg  0;zb  0 (3.9)
3.4 Numerical Examples
While Germany is one of the largest CHP markets in the world, the share of cogeneration
in its electricity production at 14.5% is still relatively low compared to other European
53countries, such as The Netherlands and Denmark with a 30% and a 53% share, respec-
tively. Germany, with similar weather conditions to The Netherlands and Denmark, has a
huge potential to increase its CHP generation both in the residential and commercial sec-
tors (BMU, 2007). Furthermore, additional CHP capacity can also contribute to ecient
and more reliable energy supply to counteract the growing intermittent production. Con-
sequently, the German government has set a target to raise the level of electricity produced
by CHP to 25% by 2020. To examine how operational risk from energy price uncertain-
ties can be managed in a microgrid in Germany, we solve the optimisation problem using
German electricity and gas spot and futures prices. For all risk-averse optimisations, a
condence level of A = 95% is used in the calculation of CVaR.
3.4.1 Spot Market Data
The parameters to generate the electricity and gas price scenarios are estimated using data
from the European Energy Exchange's (EEX) German electricity and gas spot markets
between 1 January 2010 and 2 December 2012 (Fig. 3.2). We use the hourly electricity
spot prices to calculate the daily average peak (8 AM{8 PM) and o-peak (8 PM{8 AM)
prices ( ^ P e
^ t ). By using a daily peak and o-peak (T = 14) instead of an hourly (T = 168)
granularity, we keep our problem tractable while capturing the daily variability of the
electricity price.
Figure 3.2: German O-Peak and Peak Load the Electricity Prices and the Logarithm of
the Prices
We assume that electricity prices can be described by a seasonal autoregressive in-
tegrated moving average (ARIMA) process because it takes into account the seasonal
54patterns and periods of volatility that electricity prices typically exhibit (Weron, 2007;
Cowpertwait and Metcalfe, 2009). In ARIMA models, autoregression terms express that
the modelled variable depends linearly on its previous values, while the moving average
terms incorporate the eect of previous error terms. Once we decide how many seasonal,
autoregressive and moving average terms to use, we t the model using maximum like-
lihood function with starting values minimising the conditional sum of squared errors
(Box and Jenkins, 1976). Seasonal ARIMA models can be substantially large in terms
of the number and combination of terms. Thus, we estimate the number of (seasonal
and non-seasonal) autoregressive and moving average terms iteratively by comparing the
Akaike information criterion (Cowpertwait and Metcalfe, 2009). The parameters of the
ARIMA process are given in Table 3.1. Both the autocorrelation and partial autocor-
relation function demonstrate that the peak and o-peak electricity prices follow strong
weekly seasonality (Figs. 3.3-3.4), which equals to a 14-period seasonality.
Figure 3.3: Partial Autocorrelation Function of the Electricity Price
As Fig. 3.5 shows, the selected model resulted in residuals that are approximately white
noise.
Thus, we nd that the following seasonal ARIMA process provides the best t to the
55Figure 3.4: Autocorrelation Function of the Electricity Price
electricity prices ^ P e
^ t ;^ t 2 ^ T := f1;:::;T  Wg:
(1   1   2   3)(1   1B14)(1   B)(1   B14) ^ P e
^ t =
(1 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4)(1 + 1B14 + 2B15)e
^ t: (3.10)
Here, we apply the backshift operator Bk to specify lagged prices, i.e., Bk ^ P e
^ t = ^ P e
^ t k, and
we assume that e
^ t;^ t 2 ^ T , are independent and identically distributed normal random
variables with zero mean and constant standard deviation e.
The gas price ( ~ P
g
~ t ) is assumed to follow a dynamic regression process dependent on
the generated electricity price. Since gas spot prices have a daily granularity, we calculate
the daily electricity price using the average of the respective peak and o-peak prices,
8~ t 2 ~ T := f1;:::; T
2  Wg:
~ P
e
~ t =
^ P e
2~ t 1 + ^ P e
2~ t
2
: (3.11)
The best t to the daily gas spot prices ~ P
g
~ t ;~ t 2 ~ T ; is the following dynamic regression
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model:
~ P
g
~ t =  + 1 ~ P
g
~ t 1 + 4 ~ P
g
~ t 4 + 6 ~ P
g
~ t 6
+  ~ P e
~ t +  3 ~ P e
~ t 3 +  5 ~ P e
~ t 5 + 
g
~ t; (3.12)
where we assume that 
g
~ t;~ t 2 ~ T ; are mutually independent and identically distributed
normal random variables with zero mean and constant standard deviation g, and in-
dependent from e
^ t;^ t 2 ^ T . The estimated parameters of process (3.10) and (3.12) are
displayed in Table 3.1.
For our numerical example, we build a scenario tree with seven branches per non-
terminal node, resulting in a total of S = 2401 scenarios. To examine the stability of the
scenario tree, we run the optimisation problem of a risk-neutral consumer for additional
scenario trees, with branches ranging from 3 to 7, each of them ten times. We nd
that with seven branches, the stability of the expected running cost is adequate, i.e.,
the standard deviation of the average expected cost is small, therefore, we deem 2401
scenarios sucient. To construct the scenario tree, we sample S electricity price paths
 ^ P e
s;^ t
	
^ t2^ T ;s 2 S := f1;:::;Sg; from process (3.10) and corresponding S gas price paths
 ~ P
g
s;~ t
	
~ t2~ T ;s 2 S; from process (3.12). These scenario paths are then used to construct
57the scenario tree according to the following relations, 8t 2 T ;8s 2 S;8n 2 Ns n f1g:
P
e
n;t = ^ P
e
s;t+T[w(n) 2] (3.13)
P
g
n;t =
8
<
:
~ P
g
s; t
2+ T
2 [w(n) 2] if t is even
~ P
g
s; t+1
2 + T
2 [w(n) 2] if t is odd
(3.14)
Note that, while we generate gas prices for T
2  W periods, the scenario tree contains
T  W time periods. For this reason, Eq. (3.14) assigns the same gas price to consecutive
peak and o-peak periods. Furthermore, to obtain a valid scenario tree, electricity and
gas prices at a given time period, but in dierent scenarios s and s0 have to be equal
if they share the same history of observations. In other words, the relations ^ P e
s;^ t = ^ P e
s0;^ t   ~ P
g
s;~ t = ~ P
g
s0;~ t

must be enforced if scenarios s and s0 pass through the same nodes up to
and including the stage of time period ^ t 2 ^ T
 
~ t 2 ~ T

. To provide a quick overview of the
results of the scenario generation, Figure 3.7 presents pairs of electricity and gas prices
(red circles) from generated 2401 scenarios and pairs of daily gas and peak or o-peak
load electricity prices (black squares) recorded between January 2010 and December 2012.
While most of historical data are within the area covered by generated scenarios, they
tend to correspond to lower prices. The reason for this is that the generated scenarios
represent winter prices, which are usually higher, while historical data cover the whole
year. Nevertheless, our model seems to capture adequately both the correlation between
and the range of electricity and gas prices.
Table 3.1: Estimated Process Parameters for Electricity and Gas Prices
1 =  0:7612 3 =  0:1612
2 = 0:4368 4 =  0:1584
3 = 0:2010 1 =  0:0897
1 =  0:8610 2 =  0:8714
1 = 0:2168 e = 43:40
2 =  0:7014
 = 0:5820   = 0:0183
1 = 0:9397  3 =  0:0106
4 =  0:8830  5 =  0:0126
6 = 0:1343 g = 0:8206
3.4.2 Forward Market Data
One of the main requirements for generation price scenarios is to provide an arbitrage-
free pricing environment (Klaassen, 2002), i.e., it is not possible to decrease both the
CVaR and expected cost at the same time by purchasing futures. Thus, to maintain
the no-arbitrage principle, we calculate the gas and electricity futures prices using the
corresponding average spot prices and risk premia as follows, for all c 2 C and all non-
58Figure 3.6: 90% Condence Interval of the Average Expected Cost in the Risk-Neutral
Regime
Figure 3.7: Generated Scenarios of Electricity and Natural Gas Prices Historical Data
From January 2010 to December 2012
terminal nodes n 2 N:
F e
c;n =

1
jDnj
P
n02Dn
1
jTcj
P
t2Tc P e
n0;t

(1 + e
w;c) (3.15)
Le
c =

1
jN 1j
P
n2N 1
1
jTcj
P
t2Tc P e
n;t

(1 + e
m;c) (3.16)
Lg =

1
jN 1j
P
n2N 1
1
jT j
P
t2T P
g
n;t

(1 + g
m) (3.17)
The risk premia for gas and electricity futures are calculated from the EEX Phelix and
Natural Gas Futures markets and the corresponding spot prices from the 2011{2012 period
(Table 3.2). Note that, in accordance with the Phelix market, only monthly electricity
futures have o-peak load proles. The electricity and heat loads are based on a typical
59winter energy consumption of a small hospital provided by Energy Systems Research Unit
at the University of Strathclyde (Fig. 3.8).
Figure 3.8: Electricity and Heat Consumption
Table 3.2: Risk Premia for Futures
e
m;b = 0:021 e
w;b = 0:009
e
m;o = 0:020 e
w;p = 0:041
e
m;p = 0:083 g
m = 0:004
3.4.3 Technology Data
We compare the optimal operation of the microgrid with no on-site generation, with
on-site generation without heat recovery (MT), and with on-site generation with heat
recovery (CHP). The electrical conversion eciency (Ee) of the microturbines is 35%, and
the CHP's heat-recovery rate (Ee  Eh) is 52.5%, while the boiler's conversion eciency
(Eb) is 90%. These parameters are in line with Moran et al. (2008), Siddiqui et al. (2005),
and Wickart and Madlener (2007). Finally, we consider on-site generation at 300 kWe,
600 kWe, and 900 kWe capacity levels.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main Insights
The optimisation problems are implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling System
(GAMS) using GUROBI solver on Windows workstation with an Intel Core i7 3.3GHz
60CPU and 16 GB RAM. The computational times range from 13 to 278 seconds. Our
results support previous ndings that, compared to purchasing electricity from the main
grid, on-site generation with CHP reduces signicantly the microgrid's expected energy
cost, contributes to higher energy eciency, and, hence, to lower CO2 emissions. In
addition, we nd that on-site generation with CHP can decrease the microgrid's CVaR
and, consequently, can function as a physical hedge against nancial risk. Using on-site
generation reduces both the expected running cost of the microgrid and its CVaR (Table
3.3). While higher installed capacity results in lower expected cost for both CHP and
MT, interestingly, the 300 kWe CHP unit reduces the expected cost more than even the
900 kWe MT unit.
Table 3.3: Results for Running the Microgrid under Risk-Neutral Regime (B = 0)
Case Expected
cost
(ke)
CVaR
(ke)
Eciency of
the
microgrid
Expected
CO2
emissions
(kiloton)
No on-site
generation 79.6 86.8 71.2% 0.92
300 kWe MT 78.7 86.0 69.1% 0.69
600 kWe MT 77.9 85.2 67.1% 0.86
900 kWe MT 77.0 84.6 65.2% 0.83
300 kWe CHP 71.8 78.3 75.1% 0.77
600 kWe CHP 64.0 70.0 79.5% 0.62
900 kWe CHP 58.1 64.0 82.2% 0.50
Figs. 3.9 and 3.10 present the histograms of the savings compared to no on-site
generation for each scenario. The distributions of the cost reduction with MT are right-
skewed with similar central tendencies, whereas with CHP, the distributions of the cost
reduction are close to symmetric, and the median saving increases signicantly with larger
capacity. Thus, with MT, a lower cost reduction is much more likely than with CHP, the
use of which can result in small and large cost reductions with similar probabilities.
In terms of CVaR reduction, the dierence between MT and CHP is even more pro-
nounced. First, note that the CVaR of the microgrid can be decreased either by reducing
the expected cost or by reducing the volatility of the cost of running the microgrid. While
MT reduces the CVaR at each capacity level, the CVaR reductions are, in fact, smaller
than the reduction in expected cost, i.e., the CVaR relative to the expected cost is increas-
ing. On the contrary, CHP always results in a larger CVaR reduction than the reduction
in expected cost. As the standard deviation of the gas spot price is lower than that of
the electricity spot price { 4.7% compared to 25.0% { the CHP reduces the CVaR of the
microgrid by eciently swapping electricity for gas. To generate one MWhe of electricity,
both MT and CHP require 2.8 MWh gas, but the CHP unit recovers 1.5 MWh heat at the
same time, thereby reducing the microgrid's gas purchases. Since heat consumption is on
61Figure 3.9: Cost Savings with MT Compared to No On-Site Generation
Figure 3.10: Cost Savings with CHP Compared to No On-Site Generation
average 60% higher than the electricity consumption in peak periods, and only 6% larger
in o-peak periods, the microgrid uses CHP the most when the electricity price is more
volatile. Thus, the CHP not only needs to swap less gas for a MWhe of electricity but
also does this in periods with more volatile electricity prices. This is why the reduction in
relative standard deviation for each scenario is much lower with MT (Fig. 3.11) than with
CHP (Fig. 3.12). Due to the high level of heat consumption in peak periods, operating
CHP units with larger capacity size results, on average, in a higher level of reduction in
62relative standard deviation.
Figure 3.11: Reduction in Relative Standard Deviation with MT Compared to No On-Site
Generation
Figure 3.12: Reduction in Relative Standard Deviation with CHP Compared to No On-
Site Generation
3.5.2 On-Site Generation with Futures
To examine further the risk-reducing characteristics of on-site generation, we run the
microgrid's optimisation model with a 600 kWe MT or CHP unit together with the option
63of purchasing electricity and gas futures. We nd a strong interaction between on-site
generation and nancial hedges, i.e., the type of on-site generation determines which
futures the microgrid purchases. Fig. 3.13 shows the ecient frontiers of a microgrid
with only futures purchases, with MT installation and futures purchases, and with CHP
installation and futures purchases. These frontiers are delimited by varying B parameter
in order to illustrate the mean-risk tradeo. First, note that on-site generation with MT
on its own (at B = 0) has a higher CVaR than a risk-averse microgrid with only futures
purchases (at B = 0:2), thereby indicating that nancial futures are more ecient hedges
than an MT. While electricity futures x the electricity price and can eliminate price
volatility, a microgrid with MT needs to buy spot gas at variable price. Although the
volatility of gas spot price is much lower than that of the electricity spot price, because
of the low total eciency of MT, the microgrid needs to purchase more spot gas, which
results in higher CVaR compared to purchasing only futures. Conversely, a microgrid with
a CHP unit has much lower CVaR than the most risk-averse microgrid that buys only
futures. In addition, nancial futures are more ecient at reducing CVaR together with
CHP, i.e., they have lower mean-CVaR tradeo, which is shown by the atter ecient
frontier.
Considering the microgrid with only nancial hedges, Fig. 3.14 indicates that the
more risk-averse the microgrid becomes, the more monthly base load futures it purchases.
In the most risk-averse regime at B = 10, the microgrid's CVaR reduction amounts to
e4.9k, which is 5.6% of the CVaR at the risk-neutral regime at B = 0. The reason
why the microgrid mostly purchases base load contracts is that the hospital's electricity
consumption diers only slightly between peak and o-peak periods. Thus, purchasing
monthly electricity base load futures, which have lower risk premia than monthly peak load
contracts and just slightly higher risk premia than monthly o-peak contracts, provides
a cheaper hedge. Similarly, with increasing risk aversion, the microgrid purchases more
monthly gas futures for boiler. At its maximum level of risk aversion (B = 10), the
microgrid meets 73.7% of its heat demand through monthly gas contracts (Fig. 3.15).
In comparison to a microgrid with only futures trading, in a risk-averse microgrid
with MT, the share of monthly base load electricity futures decreases signicantly and is
only non-negligible with higher levels of risk aversion (Fig. 3.16). The microgrid meets
on average 20% of its electricity consumption with on-site generation using gas spot.
With risk aversion, the share of o-peak monthly futures and weekly base load futures
in electricity consumption rst increases and later slightly decreases. This indicates that
monthly base load futures are substitutes for weekly base load and monthly o-peak
load electricity futures. Furthermore, the share of on-site generation with spot gas also
decreases slightly from 19.2% at B = 0 to 16.5% at B = 10. Thus, the microgrid uses
its MT well below its capacity limit, which would be 62.5% on average, and, in order to
decrease its CVaR, it has to operate the MT less. As using the MT has an undesirable
64Figure 3.13: Ecient Frontiers with Futures Purchases
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Figure 3.14: Electricity Consumption Without On-Site Generation
eect on the microgrid's CVaR, it purchases electricity futures with the lowest risk premia,
such as weekly base load and monthly o-peak load contracts. Since a microgrid with
MT can use only the boiler to meet its heat demand, its heat consumption is the same as
with no on-site generation, i.e., monthly gas future purchases increases with risk aversion
(Fig. 3.15).
Finally, Fig. 3.17 shows the share of on-site generation and futures purchases in
the electricity consumption of a microgrid with an installed CHP unit. The presence
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Figure 3.15: Heating Consumption with Only Available Futures
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Figure 3.16: Electricity Consumption with MT
of CHP increases the demand for monthly gas futures signicantly. An MT unit with
lower energy eciency cannot use monthly gas contracts due to their higher prices, which
would negate its achievable cost reduction. A microgrid with a CHP unit, on the other
hand, can tolerate the risk premia, and with xed gas prices, it attains greater CVaR
reduction. In fact, the total share of on-site generation with CHP increases from 56.3%
at B = 0 to 57.7% at B = 10. Thus, the CVaR-reducing demand for both gas futures
and on-site generation with CHP increase at the same time, which indicates that they are
66complements. Compared to a microgrid with MT, a microgrid with CHP purchases almost
no o-peak monthly and weekly base load electricity futures, and slightly less monthly
base load futures. As CHP decreases the microgrid's CVaR on its own, the scope for CVaR
reduction from electricity futures is much lower. The microgrid purchases only monthly
electricity base load futures in considerable amount since, as Fig. 3.14 indicates, these
futures can be used the most eciently to reduce the microgrid's CVaR when the 600
kWe CHP unit is not enough to meet all electricity demand. Still, the share of electricity
futures is much lower compared to the one of the microgrid with no on-site generation and
microgrid with MT, thereby indicating that on-site generation with CHP and electricity
futures are substitutes. As a result of the high share of on-site generation, on average
64.6% of the microgrid's heat consumption is met through heat recovery. In the most
risk-averse regime at B = 10, the microgrid's CVaR reduction amounts to e4.1k which is
5.9% of the CVaR at the risk-neutral regime at B = 0. This is slightly higher in relative
terms than the maximum CVaR reduction in a microgrid with no on-site generation,
which indicates that gas futures are more ecient in reducing CVaR when used with
CHP.
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Figure 3.17: Electricity Consumption with CHP
3.6 Conclusions
With growing demand for cheap and reliable electricity, microgrids are likely to play a vital
role in the future energy industry. In accordance with previous studies, our results show
that a microgrid with an installed CHP unit can, indeed, contribute to energy savings
and lower CO2 emissions. To encourage customer adoption, numerous initiatives and
67subsidy schemes have been introduced by the EU and its member states. However, the
development of the microgrid and CHP sectors have been slower than expected. One of
the possible reasons for this is the nancial uncertainty associated with operating on-site
generation due to deregulated energy markets.
We present a multi-stage mean-risk stochastic optimisation model that can be used to
reduce a microgrid's operational risk exposure through on-site generation and electricity
and gas futures purchases. By applying this model to a hypothetical hospital, we nd
that on-site generation, either with MT or with CHP, can reduce the expected operational
cost of energy procurement. However, the reduction in expected cost with MT without
heat recovery is minimal, and the microgrid's CVaR relative to its expected cost is larger
than without on-site generation. This is in contrast to the results in Chapter 2, where
we nd that on-site generation without heat recovery can function also as a physical
hedge, i.e., it can reduce the variability of the microgrid's expected cost. As the decision
time periods are much longer in the previous technology selection model than in the
operational model, i.e., 2190 hours compared to 12 hours, this indicates that an MT unit,
because of its low eciency, cannot exploit the dierence in gas and electricity prices
when it is sustained for only a short period. In contrast, a microgrid with CHP can
lower its expected cost signicantly, on average 8.7-fold more than MT, and can reduce
the microgrid's CVaR both in absolute terms and relative to its expected cost. This
supports our ndings in Chapter 2, and conrms the value of CHP as a physical hedge.
Furthermore, when the microgrid has access to futures markets, we nd that monthly
gas futures and on-site generation with CHP exhibit complementarity, i.e., the presence
of gas futures increases the demand of a risk-averse microgrid for on-site generation.
Therefore, improving gas futures market liquidity can contribute to customer adoption of
DG and, hence, it can lead to more sustainable electricity generation. On the other hand,
we nd that electricity futures are substitutes for on-site generation. Nevertheless, both
the microgrid's attributes as a physical hedge and its interaction with gas futures can
be utilised only with a stochastic programming model. Thus, in contrast to the extant
literature, we provide a risk-management strategy for improving the viability of CHP as
well as policy insights regarding access to liquid futures markets.
68Chapter 4
Transmission and Wind Investment
in a Deregulated Electricity Industry
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background
Restructuring of the electric power industry was precipitated by the belief that the reg-
ulated paradigm would not meet growing demand eciently (Hyman, 2010). As the
functions of the industry such as generation, distribution, and retailing could be handled
together by an investor-owned utility (IOU) with transmission planning and reliability
under the auspices of a system operator, there was little incentive to develop new tech-
nologies for the market when prots were regulated. At the same time, since a single IOU
operated in each area and prices were merely set administratively, there was no need for
either risk management or strategic analysis. Although a plethora of post-restructuring
market designs have emerged (Wilson, 2002), they have generally required incumbent
IOUs to divest their generation assets with transmission and distribution remaining reg-
ulated. Consequently, these reforms have introduced endogenous price formation and im-
perfect competition, which necessitate a strategic view of decision making (Hobbs, 1995;
Helman, 2004). Moreover, market-driven transmission investment has been proposed by
the US FERC's July 2002 Standard Market Design (SMD) and the EU's Regulation EC
1228/2003 (Commission of the European Communities, 2003).
Recently, sustainability issues have entered the policy debate. Several governments
are committed to CO2 emissions targets in order to mitigate the eects of climate change,
e.g., the EU's aim of 20-20-20 by 2020 (Communication from the European Commission,
2014). The policymaking dilemma is to forge a delicate balance between achieving the
targets while not interfering with industry. Ironically, relative to the centralised paradigm,
policymakers have ceded more control to industry while simultaneously having set loftier
goals in terms of economic eciency and environmental sustainability. Since much of
69the transition to a sustainable energy system will rely on wind as a lynchpin technology,
aspects of wind such as intermittency, non-dispatchability, and remoteness mean that
policymakers will need to consider concomitant transmission expansion when devising
measures to encourage wind investment (Kunz, 2013). Consequently, policymakers re-
quire a deeper understanding of how market designs interact with strategic behaviour in
delivering outcomes.
4.1.2 Literature Review
Under regulation, conventional least-cost methods could be employed to determine opti-
mal transmission and generation investment (Hobbs, 1995). However, with deregulation,
transmission and generation investment are made by separate entities with distinct and
often conicting incentives. For example, regulated transmission system operators (TSOs)
seek to maximise social welfare, while power companies are interested in prot maximisa-
tion. In order to handle such game-theoretic interactions, complementarity modelling has
been proposed to nd Nash equilibria, i.e., solutions from which no agent has a unilateral
incentive to deviate (Gabriel et al., 2012; Ruiz et al., 2014). Furthermore, complemen-
tarity modelling is amenable for analysing strategic behaviour in deregulated electricity
industries due to its accommodation of physical features of the power system, i.e., Kir-
cho's laws and intermittent generation (Hobbs, 2001).
The interaction of market agents maximising their objective functions results in an
equilibrium problem. Since for linear and convex non-linear programs the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions are both necessary and sucient (Gabriel et al.,
2012), the solution to agents' problems are equivalent to solutions of the corresponding
complementarity problem (Fig. 4.1). Bi-level models are particularly relevant for policy
analysis of the strategic interactions that arise when a dominant (leader) agent inuences
equilibrium prices by anticipating the decisions of followers at the lower level. Eectively,
the leader's optimisation problem is constrained by a set of optimisation problems and
equilibrium constraints at the lower level. If each lower-level problem is convex, then it
may be replaced by its KKT conditions, thereby re-formulating the bi-level problem as a
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Ruiz and Conejo (2009) ad-
dress the optimal oering strategy of a dominant power company with endogeneity in the
objective function, i.e., the income of the power company is the product of the generation
level and the equilibrium demand, which in turn depends on the generation level. Con-
sequently, this results in an MPEC with non-linear objective function which tends to be
dicult to solve (Bussieck and Vigerske, 2010). Ruiz and Conejo (2009) demonstrate that
such problems may be resolved by using strong duality (Bertsekas, 1999) to render the
problem as a MILP and to treat complementarity conditions via disjunctive constraints
(Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981). An alternative approach is presented in Wogrin et al.
70Figure 4.1: Equilibrium Problems and Their Re-Formulations
(2011) where the endogeneity in the MPEC's objective function is re-formulated through
bi-linear expansion.
Closer to our eort are Garc es et al. (2009) with a welfare-maximising TSO at the
upper level making transmission investment constrained by market clearing at the lower
levels and Baringo and Conejo (2012) with a cost-minimising TSO at the upper level
making both transmission and wind investment decisions constrained by market-clearing
decisions of producers at the lower level(s). In contrast to Burke and O'Malley (2010) that
assume a xed transmission network, Baringo and Conejo (2012) illustrate the need to con-
sider transmission and wind jointly. Still within a bi-level framework, Wogrin et al. (2013)
use the framework of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to investigate a two-stage duopoly
in which producers make investment decisions in the rst stage and operational ones in
the second stage. Within multi-stage games, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) distinguish
closed-loop and open-loop information structures. A game corresponds to the closed-loop
information structure if participants can condition their decisions at any given stage on all
the decisions made up until that stage. Conversely, in a game with an open-loop informa-
tion structure, the history of play does not have any eect on the participants' decisions,
which depend only on the corresponding time period. Wogrin et al. (2013) nd that a
closed-loop bi-level equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) yields the
same result as an open-loop mixed-complementarity problem (MCP) for any conjectural
71variation in the spot market as long as there is a single load period and the spot market
is at least as competitive as in the Cournot case. This justies a single-level approxima-
tion of the producers' bi-level problem. Such an equivalence may still hold when there
are multiple load periods as demonstrated by an example from Wogrin et al. (2013).
However, at the same time, Wogrin et al. (2013) present a counter-example in which the
installed capacity is actually lower in the closed-loop (EPEC) model relative to the open-
loop (MCP) model when spot markets are closer to being perfectly competitive, thereby
indicating that open-loop results may not always generalise for multiple time periods.
Moving on to a tri-level model, Sauma and Oren (2006, 2007) have a welfare-maximising
TSO at the upper level making transmission investments, producers at the middle level
making generation capacity investments, and market clearing at the lower level. Thus,
this is a more complicated problem than even an EPEC, but Sauma and Oren (2006, 2007)
do not attempt to solve it directly. Rather, they compare pre-determined transmission
investment proposals from the perspective of various planners. In contrast to Sauma and
Oren (2006), Sauma and Oren (2007) focus on market power by the producers and note
that diverging objectives for the TSO may lead to politically infeasible investment plans.
Although transmission expansion has largely remained under the control of regulated
TSOs, market-based models for transmission investment have been proposed in both the
UK and the US. For example, Hogan (1992) posits a role for a merchant investor (MI)
who would build new transmission lines motivated by the collection of congestion rents
between grid nodes. However, the ecient outcomes hypothesised by Hogan (1992) under
the MI are subverted if market power exists (Joskow and Tirole, 2005). In discussing
the landscape for merchant transmission investment in Europe, Kristiansen and Rosell on
(2010) note that nancial transmission rights (FTRs) would be benecial for dealing with
externalities and providing hedging capabilities for investors. Yet, empirical analyses of
markets for FTRs in the US have shown ineciencies, e.g., divergent forward and spot
prices for congestion rents, to exist in their operations, especially in congested regions
(Bartholomew et al., 2003).
4.1.3 Research Objectives and Contribution
Given this background, we aim to gain policy insights into market design by analysing
transmission and wind investment by distinct agents reecting strategic behaviour: at the
upper level, we posit that a TSO or an MI invests in new transmission lines (acting as
a Stackelberg leader), while at the lower level, prot-maximising conventional and wind
producers make investment and operational decisions with transmission ows governed by
the relevant grid owner. In contrast to Baringo and Conejo (2012), we allow for market
power at the lower level and nd that this specication of industry (as behaving either
perfectly competitively or  a la Cournot) aects both lower- and upper-level decisions.
72Moreover, unlike the extant literature, we investigate the implications of transmission
investment made by an MI in a bi-level model. Finally, similarly to Tanaka and Chen
(2013), we explore the impact of a policy measure such as the renewable portfolio stan-
dard (RPS). In this type of scheme, producers are required to supply a certain percentage
of electricity from renewables to meet the quota set by the government (Kovacevic et al.,
2013). They can either generate electricity from renewable sources for which they receive
renewable energy certicate (REC) on a pro rata basis, or they can comply with the reg-
ulation by purchasing the required amount of RECs. As RECs are traded on a separate
certicate market, theoretically, such regulation leads to ecient outcomes (Haas et al.,
2011). A similar scheme is the cap-and-trade mechanism for emissions, which could also
be investigated using our approach (Limpaitoon et al., 2014). In a cap-and-trade system,
a limit is set on the total amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by specied
sectors in a given year. Within the cap, companies receive emission allowances that they
can trade with one another as needed. To avoid severe nes, at the end of year, each
participating company must possess enough allowances to cover its greenhouse emissions
it released.
We demonstrate that results are largely intuitive if producers at the lower level are
price takers: generation capacity is added by the least costly producers, the conventional
producer at the node with the highest demand does not face competition, and power
ows from the less costly wind producer to the node with more capital-intensive (wind)
producers. The impact of having the TSO or the MI at the upper level aects mainly the
magnitudes of the outcomes and not their fundamental compositions. Under a lower-level
industry behaving as a Cournot oligopoly, however, regardless of the market design (TSO
or MI), a greater fraction of generation comes from wind because producers withhold
capacity. Their exercise of market power causes a welfare-maximising TSO to subsidise
wind to boost consumer surplus and a prot-maximising MI to build more transmission
lines in order to encourage more transmission ow. The somewhat counterintuitive re-
sult under a Cournot oligopoly leads to power ow from a wind producer to the node
where a conventional producer was the sole incumbent. Finally, by implementing an RPS
constraint requiring a given percentage of energy to be provided by renewable sources,
we examine how the renewable-boosting outcome of the oligopoly may be attained even
under perfect competition.
734.2 Problem Formulation
4.2.1 Nomenclature
Indices and Sets
i 2 I: power producers
Ic  I: conventional power producers
Iw  I: wind power producers
n 2 N: grid nodes
n
+
` : node index for starting node of line `
n
 
` : node index for ending node of line `
` 2 L: transmission lines
j 2 J`: discrete capacity level of transmission investment on line ` (including the existing
level, j0)
L+
n: set of lines starting at node n
L 
n: set of lines ending at node n
t 2 T : time periods
s 2 S: scenarios
Parameters
Carc
`;j : amortised expansion cost (including for the existing level, Carc
`;j0 = 0) of line ` with
capacity level j (e/MW)
Karc
`;j : transmission capacity (including for the existing level, Karc
`;j0) of line ` with capacity
level j (MW)
B`;j: network susceptance of line ` with capacity level j (1=
)
Sn 2 f0;1g: dummy parameter for slack node ({)
Aint
n : intercept of the inverse demand curve at node n (e/MW)
Aslp
n : slope of the inverse demand curve at node n (e/MW2)
i0;i;n: conjectured response of producer i0 on the change in sales by producer i at node n
({)
Cinv
n;i : amortised investment cost of producer i at node n (e/MW)
C
prod
n;i : generation cost of producer i at node n (e/MW)
K
prod
n;i : initial generation capacity of producer i at node n (MW)
En;t;s: availability factor for wind generation at node n in period t for scenario s ({)
Ps: probability of scenario s ({)
R: renewable portfolio standard (RPS) requirement (%)
74Primal Variables
dn;t;s: voltage angle at node n in period t for scenario s (rad)
u`;j: transmission investment in capacity level j for line ` (MW)
f`;j;t;s: realised ow on line ` at capacity level j in period t for scenario s (MW)
^ f`;t;s: realised ow on line ` in period t for scenario s (MW)
ginv
n;i : generation capacity investment at node n by producer i (MW)
q
prod
n;i;t;s: generation at node n by producer i in period t for scenario s (MW)
qsell
n;i;t;s: sales at node n by producer i in period t for scenario s (MW)
pn;t;s: electricity price at node n in period t for scenario s (e/MW)
Dual Variables

+
`;j;t;s;
 
`;j;t;s: shadow price on capacity for transmission line ` at capacity level j in period
t for scenario s (e/MW)
 `;j;t;s: shadow price on electricity ow on line ` at capacity level j in period t for scenario
s (e/MW)
`;t;s: shadow price on electricity ow on line ` in period t for scenario s (e/MW)
n;t;s: congestion fee at node n in period t for scenario s (e/MW)
n;t;s: dual for slack node n in period t for scenario s ({)
c
n;i;t;s;w
n;i;t;s: shadow price on generation capacity at node n for producer i in period t
for scenario s (e/MW)
i;t;s: shadow price on energy balance for producer i in period t for scenario s (e/MW)
t;s: renewable energy certicate (REC) price in period t for scenario s (e/MW)
4.2.2 Assumptions
We assume that transmission capacity expansion can be made in discrete levels, j 2 J`,
for each line ` 2 L of the network. The susceptance of a line, B`;j, and, thus, the
power ow, f`;j;t;s, depend on the chosen capacity level. Following Baringo and Conejo
(2012), we use a DC load-ow approximation for network power ows, which is an ac-
ceptable convention in power systems economics as long as voltage angle dierences are
small, and assume that the realised power ow on line ` for capacity level j in pe-
riod t and scenario s is proportional to the susceptance and voltage angle dierence,
i.e., f`;j;t;s = u`;jB`;j(dn+
` ;t;s   dn 
` ;t;s); 8`;t;s;8j 2 J`. If capacity level j is for line
`, then u`;j = 1 with f`;j;t;s being positive or negative, depending on the direction of
the ow. Furthermore, for j0 2 J` n fjg, u`;j0 = 0 such that f`;j0;t;s = 0 without any
articial constraints on the voltage angles. Thus, the realised ow on line ` can be
computed as ^ f`;t;s =
P
j2J` f`;j;t;s; 8`;t;s. As a result, the net imports at node n are
P
`2L 
n
^ f`;t;s  
P
`2L+
n
^ f`;t;s.
75Each producer is either conventional (using fossil fuel) or wind. Conventional pro-
ducers, i 2 Ic, have linear cost functions, while wind producers, i 2 Iw, do not incur
operational costs. In addition, conventional producers can decide how much to generate,
whereas wind output is variable and non-dispatchable, i.e., determined by the availability
factors En;t;s. Such variability in wind output may be due to diering wind potentials
at various locations and uncertainty in future eciency improvements of the technology.
Other sources of variability, such as demand uncertainty, river inows, and plant outages,
likewise, drive investment decisions. However, whereas power companies may have years
of experience in forecasting these sources, this may not be the case for the future availabil-
ity of wind. Moreover, with the expected growth in renewables, wind power may account
for a substantial share of variability in a future power system, and we take this as our
main focus while acknowledging that it is not the only driver of investment. Meanwhile,
since market rules like priority of wind production limit curtailment except in extreme
situations, we assume wind to be non-dispatchable. Nevertheless, our model can easily
be adapted to incorporate the dispatch of wind production. We account for variability
in wind output by assuming a known and discrete distribution described by a number of
scenarios capturing the wind availability factors (En;t;s) and their probabilities (Ps).
While any producer can install capacity at any node and sell electricity generated else-
where by accessing transmission capacity, most power companies are well diversied and
may own a portfolio of both conventional and wind plants. However, specialisation also
leads rms to concentrate on particular technologies, e.g., Limpaitoon et al. (2014) report
that the largest two rms in California have proportionately less conventional generation
than the others as part of their portfolios. Thus, it is appropriate to think of each producer
in our model as being a composite producer of a particular type (either predominantly
conventional or predominantly wind). We assume that each node n in our transmission
grid has its own linear inverse demand, pn;t;s = Aint
n   Aslp
n
P
i2I qsell
n;i;t;s, in each period
t and scenario s, which depends on sales at the node by all producers in equilibrium.
Depending on the market design, each producer is part of either a Cournot oligopoly or
a perfectly competitive industry. The degree of market power is reected by the conjec-
tured price response, which is the rst derivative of the inverse demand with respect to
electricity sold by a given producer, i.e.,
@pn;t;s
@qsell
n;i;t;s
=  Aslp
n

1 +
P
i02Infig i0;i;n

;8n;i;t;s,
where i0;i;n =
@qsell
n;i0;t;s
@qsell
n;i;t;s
for i0 2 I n fig and i0;i;n = 1 otherwise. Hence, we model perfect
competition and Cournot oligopoly when
P
i02Infig i0;i;n equals  1 and 0, respectively.
We formulate the transmission-expansion problem of the MI as a bi-level problem:
transmission investment decisions are made at an upper level by the MI in anticipation
of subsequent investment in and operation of wind and conventional generation capacity
by the producers, transmission ow decisions of the MI, and market clearing, all cap-
tured by a number of lower-level problems. Eectively, we have a dominant MI investing
76in transmission capacity with wind and conventional producers as followers. We do not
consider competing MIs for three reasons. First, this would typically involve a third
decision-making level for procurement of transmission investment rights, which would
make the problem a tri-level one (Sauma and Oren, 2007) and, therefore, much more
computationally challenging. Second, only a few entities have the expertise to carry out
transmission projects, e.g., the BritNed DC cable between the UK and The Netherlands
was constructed in 2011 as a joint venture formed by a private holding company involving
the National Grid and TenneT. Third, we would like to compare the MI and TSO market
designs, and introducing a third level with procurement auctions would preclude such an
analysis.
To approximate the impact on generation expansion and operational planning, the
producers' problems are single level. This leads to an open-loop problem (MCP) for
the producers rather than a more complicated closed-loop one (EPEC). While treating
the producers' problems over two levels may impact our results based on the ndings of
Wogrin et al. (2013), we feel justied in using an open-loop representation of the pro-
ducers' problems because the discrepancy between open- and closed-loop models occurs
only for departures from a Cournot setting. Indeed, the imperfectly competitive nature
of most electricity spot markets implies that it is important to focus on the Cournot case,
which is a central point of our paper and an issue that is relatively unaddressed in most
hierarchical models of transmission investment. Although transmission and generation
investment decisions are static, we allow for dynamic operational decisions and allocation
of transmission capacity over time and scenarios. Thus, investment decisions are made
in a rst stage without anticipation of the wind output, whereas operational decisions
are adapted to the realised scenario of availability factors, which leads to a two-stage
stochastic program (Fig. 4.2). The stochastic bi-level problem can be re-formulated as an
MPEC with equilibrium constraints obtained by deriving the optimality conditions for all
lower-level problems. Since the lower level comprises convex optimisation problems, their
KKT conditions are sucient for optimality.
As benchmarks, we consider market designs with either a welfare-maximising central
planner (CP) or a TSO. Since the CP mimics the regulated paradigm by controlling all
aspects of the energy market, it solves a single-level stochastic problem covering transmis-
sion and generation investment as well as generation dispatch and transmission ows. Like
the MI, the TSO has a bi-level stochastic programming problem with all decisions made
as per the MI market design. The only dierence is that the TSO maximises expected
social welfare (SW) rather than expected prot from grid operations. Finally, in antici-
pation of forthcoming EU 2030 targets, we also run a numerical example with a stringent
RPS target of 80%. This is plausible because the EU will require a 40% reduction in CO2
emissions by 2030 relative to 1990 levels, which necessitates a deep decarbonisation of the
power sector specically due to foreseen electrication of the transport sector. Hitting
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these targets will mean surmounting numerous technical challenges, but we are focused
more on the implications of market design in such a transition assuming legally binding
policy commitments.
4.2.3 Merchant Investor
MI's Upper-Level Problem
At the upper level, the MI decides on the transmission capacity level of a number of exist-
ing or potentially newly constructed transmission lines in order to maximise its expected
prot given by the dierence between grid congestion rents and investment costs:
max
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s.t. u`;j 2 f0;1g; 8`;8j 2 J` (4.2)
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Note that if u`;j0 = 1, then existing capacity remains and no new capacity is con-
structed. We model congestion pricing by assuming that all power ows through a hub
node of the network without generation and consumption (Hobbs, 2001). Thus, transmis-
sion ow between any two nodes is assumed to take place in two parts. The electricity
ows from the injecting node to the hub node and then from the hub node to the receiving
78node. As we use a linearised DC approximation for network load ows, the choice of hub
node is arbitrary, i.e., load ows resulting from a unit injection at one node and a unit
withdrawal at another do not depend on the selected hub through which the transmission
is routed. We further assume that the MI charges a node-dependent congestion fee, n;t;s,
for transmitting power from this hub to each node. The shadow price on market-clearing
condition (4.35) sets the congestion fee. Upper-level problem (4.1)-(4.3) is constrained by
lower-level problems and equilibrium conditions.
MI's Lower-Level Problem
At the lower level, the MI determines ows on existing and newly constructed lines in
order to maximise expected congestion rents:
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where   = f ^ f`;t;s;f`;j;t;s;dn;t;sg and u.r.s. denotes variables of unrestricted sign. Con-
straint (4.5) denes the ow on each line for each capacity level as a function of the
dierence in voltage angles, transmission capacity choice (xed at the upper level), and
line susceptance (Baringo and Conejo, 2012). The upper and lower limits on transmission
ows for each capacity level of each line are set by (4.6) and (4.7), respectively, while
(4.8) indicates the realised ow on each line. Restrictions (4.9) set the slack node for
calculating voltage angles of the network. Moreover, the corresponding dual variables are
in brackets.
The KKT conditions for the MI's lower-level problem are:
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Producers' Lower-Level Problems
Each conventional producer i 2 Ic decides on investment and operation of generating
units by maximising expected prot. This is revenue minus congestion rent, operating
cost, compliance cost with the RPS stemming from renewable energy certicates (RECs),
and investment cost:
max
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Here,  i = fq
prod
n;i;t;s;qsell
n;i;t;s;ginv
n;i g. Congestion pricing implies that a producer receives a
payment to send power from the generation node to the hub node, while it makes a
payment to send power from the hub node to the sales node. Correspondingly, the cost of
80transmitting electricity from node n to node n0 is  n;t;s+n0;t;s. Since in our model every
ow is routed through the hub node, this pricing method ensures that producers selling
electricity at their local nodes do not pay for transmission as their payments and receipts
cancel out. Also, note that the cost of transmission can be negative, which implies that
the grid owner subsidises the the load ow. The transmission payments are again shadow
prices from the market-clearing condition (4.35). The problem is subject to capacity
constraints on production (4.20) and energy balance between total production and sales
(4.21). Following Tanaka and Chen (2013), we account for the renewable energy credit
(REC) payment via the exogenous RPS fraction, R, and the shadow price on the RPS
constraint (4.36).
The KKT conditions for this problem are:
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Each wind power producer i 2 Iw faces a similar problem:
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Note that in the objective function production costs of wind power production are as-
81sumed to be negligible and REC payments are replaced by earnings from RECs. Further-
more, the constraint (4.20) is replaced by (4.29) to reect the non-dispatchable nature of
wind.
The corresponding KKT conditions are:
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Equilibrium Conditions
Market-clearing conditions stipulate that the transmission ow supplied by the grid owner
to node n equals the producers' demand for transmission capacity, which they require in
order to sell electricity at this node:
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The RPS constraint requires that share of wind power production from the total produc-
tion is at least R:
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The MI's MPEC is:
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4.2.4 Transmission System Operator
At the upper level, the TSO decides on transmission capacity such as to maximise expected
social welfare. To determine the social welfare, we calculate rst the consumers' surplus
by integrating the inverse demand function from zero demand to the equilibrium demand.
The social welfare is then given by subtracting the producers' variable and investment
costs as well as the cost of grid expansion from the consumers' surplus:
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s.t. (4.2)   (4.3)
At the lower level, the TSO enforces network feasibility constraints, i.e., load power
ows are determined by voltage angle dierences and they cannot exceed line capacities,
(4.5)-(4.10), in which u`;j is xed at the upper level. Thus, the TSO's MPEC is:
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4.2.5 Central Planner
The CP's optimisation problem can be solved as stochastic mixed-integer non-linear pro-
gramming (MINLP) problem. The non-linearity stems from constraint (4.5), which in-
cludes the product of two decision variables. The CP's MINLP is formulated as:
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4.3 Problem Re-Formulations
Since MPEC model formulations involve a large number of complementarity constraints,
they are highly non-linear. Currently, solvers for such non-linear problems are experi-
mental and cannot guarantee global optima (Rosenthal, 2014), i.e., MPEC solvers based
on the reduced gradient method are likely to converge to a local optimum (Gabriel et
al., 2012). The MI's MPEC formulation poses additional diculties since its objective
function is also non-linear due to endogeneity. The MI's income is the sum of the products
of the transmission ow and the congestion fee on each line, however, the congestion fee
itself depends on the ow determined by the MI. Nevertheless, these MPEC problems
can be re-cast as MILPs or mixed-integer quadratic programs (MIQPs), which can be
then solved with advanced branch-and-cut algorithms. While research on solving MINLP
problems is further ahead (Lee and Leyer, 2012), it is still a new eld, and solving an
MINLP, if it is possible at all, takes much longer than solving an MILP. Therefore, we
re-formulate the CP's MINLP problem as well.
Thus, starting with the MI's MPEC formulation, we linearise its objective function by
applying strong duality (Luenberger and Ye, 2008) from linear programming (LP) to its
lower-level problem (4.4)-(4.10):
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Consequently, the non-linear part of the MI's objective function can be replaced by a
linear expression to yield the following objective function:
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For this to hold, the primal and dual solutions, ^ f`;t;s, n;t;s, 
+
`;j;t;s, and 
 
`;j;t;s must satisfy
the KKT conditions of the MI's lower-level problem.
Next, the KKT conditions can be replaced by disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat
and McCarl, 1981). For the MI's lower-level problem, constraints (4.11)-(4.18) can be
re-formulated as:
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For conventional producer i 2 Ic, the KKT conditions (4.23)-(4.27) are re-formulated
in the same manner:
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Analogously, for wind producer i 2 Iw, the disjunctive constraints are the same as in
(4.54)-(4.65) with the following replacements for (4.56), (4.58), (4.60), and (4.61), which
correspond to (4.32)-(4.34):
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Finally, the market-clearing and RPS constraints (4.35)-(4.36) become:
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Hence, the MILP for the MI is:
max
fu`;jg[ [ i[MI[MI (4.39)
s.t. (4.2)   (4.3); (4.40)   (4.53); (4.54)   (4.55);(4.57);(4.59);
(4.62)   (4.65) 8i 2 I; (4.56);(4.58);(4.60);(4.61) 8i 2 I
c;
(4.66)   (4.69) 8i 2 I
w; (4.70)   (4.74)
where MI = fw
prod
n;i;t;s;wsell
n;i;t;s;winv
n;i ;wc
n;i;t;s;ww
n;i;t;s;warc+
`;j;t;s;warc 
`;j;t;s;w
t;s; aux
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87Since the TSO's objective function (4.37) is quadratic, we directly use disjunctive
constraints to formulate its MPEC as an MIQP:
max
fu`;jg[ [ i[TSO[TSO (4.37)
s.t. (4.2)   (4.3); (4.8)   (4.10);(4.45)   (4.46);(4.54)   (4.55);(4.57);(4.59);
(4.62)   (4.65) 8i 2 I; (4.56);(4.58);(4.60);(4.61) 8i 2 I
c;
(4.66)   (4.69) 8i 2 I
w; (4.70)   (4.74)8`;t;s;8j 2 J`
where TSO = fw
prod
n;i;t;s;wsell
n;i;t;s;winv
n;i ;wc
n;i;t;s;ww
n;i;t;s;w
t;sg.
Likewise, the CP's MINLP may be re-formulated as an MIQP:
max
fu`;jg[ [ i
(4.37)
s.t. (4.2)   (4.3);(4.8)   (4.10);(4.20) 8i 2 I
c;
(4.21)   (4.22) 8i 2 I;(4.29) 8i 2 I
w;
(4.35);(4.38);(4.45)   (4.46)
4.4 Numerical Examples
4.4.1 Data
We implement the three market designs on a three-node network with two operating hours
and scenarios (Fig. 4.3). The arrows indicate forward directions for the ows, i.e., the cor-
responding decision variable will have a positive (negative) sign if the realised ow is in the
indicated (opposite) direction. All nodes are initially disconnected, but transmission lines
with attributes given in Fig. 4.4 may be built. In the DC load-ow model, the ease with
which current passes through a line is denoted by susceptance. In Fig. 4.4, we indicate
the transmission capacity (susceptance) by the broken (solid) series measured on the left
(right) axis. Specically, we consider fteen discrete capacity levels with corresponding
susceptances. The susceptance of a line is determined by several factors, such as physical
characteristics of the conductor, i.e., its length, cross-section area, and material compo-
sition, and it is aected also by conditions the line is used in, i.e., applied voltage, air
temperature, and atmospheric pressure. Assuming typical values for aluminium conduc-
tors, we calculate the transmission capacities and susceptances based on Reta-Hern andez
(2012). Although in our example the network is initially disconnected, because we discre-
tise the transmission capacity levels, we could easily implement an instance with positive
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initial line capacities. Since we model representative hours, the transmission investment
costs for lines of length 700 km are amortised on an hourly basis assuming a construc-
tion cost of $1080/(MW-km), which is in line with Baringo and Conejo (2102). These
costs range from e11.9/MW to e337/MW for 220 kV lines corresponding to capacities
3.7 MW to 103.7 MW, respectively. For generation, we use the US Energy Information
Administration's 2014 Annual Energy Outlook to calculate operating costs and amortised
capacity costs of conventional ($2930/kW capital cost and 40% eciency for coal) and
wind plants (capital costs of $2210/kW and $6230/kW for onshore and oshore turbines,
respectively). All amortisation assumes a lifetime of 20 years and an interest rate of 3%
per annum. Finally, in Table 4.1, we assume that the demand centre is at node 1 (with an
existing conventional plant), but potential wind resources are based at thinly populated
locations (nodes 2 and 3).
Table 4.1: Demand and Production Parameters
Parameter n = 1 n = 2 n = 3
i = 1 i = 2 i = 3
Aint
n 110 70 60
Aslp
n 1 1 1
En;s;1 0 0.30 0.45
En;1;2 0 0.33 0.50
En;2;2 0 0.27 0.41
Cinv
n;i 12.58 9.47 26.71
C
prod
n;i 21 0 0
K
prod
n;i 15 0 0
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4.4.2 Computational Issues
The problems are implemented in GAMS running on a Windows workstation with a 3.30
GHz Intel i7 core processor and 16 GB RAM. While the MI's MPEC is re-formulated as an
MILP, the CP's MINLP and the TSO's MPEC are re-formulated as MIQPs. All problems
are solved via GUROBI. Computational times with two periods and two scenarios range
from less than one second (CP and all TSO instances) to 855 s (MI with PC) and 7735 s
(MI with CO). In the latter instance, there are 3,481 equations, 1,520 continuous variables,
and 484 discrete variables. The relative optimality gap is set to 5%.
4.4.3 Example 1: Base Case without RPS
As a benchmark, we nd that the CP simply matches the most ecient resource with the
most valuable demand nodes (Table 4.2). The conventional producer at node 1 serves all
of the local demand, while transmission lines are constructed from nodes 2 to 3 with an
eectively zero expected prot, E[n;i], for producers if the subsidy on congestion rent
from the CP and the legacy capacity for the conventional producer are ignored. More-
over, the expected prot from grid operations, E[arc], is negative as congestion rents are
internalised in a centrally planned economy. Meanwhile, the TSO's result under perfect
competition is similar to that of the CP aside from the levying of congestion rents, which
drives the producers' expected prots to zero (with the exception of the conventional
producer). This is in contrast to Sauma and Oren (2006) because of the dierence in
formulation: we have sales and dispatch decisions made by producers, whereas Sauma
and Oren (2006) assume that only dispatch is made by producers with sales and ow
90decisions performed by a welfare-maximising TSO. The MI under perfect competition de-
livers a lower social welfare because of its incentive to maximise its own expected prot,
which is attained by reducing line capacities to boost congestion rents. Consequently, the
producers adopt less generation capacity, and the expected nodal prices and dierences
in expected congestion rents are higher. For example, under the MI, it costs a perfectly
competitive producer at node 2 nearly e16/MW to send power to node 3 as opposed to
about e4/MW with a TSO. Hence, the MI delivers lower social welfare and less renewable
generation than the TSO.
Under a Cournot oligopoly, producers have the incentive to withhold generation ca-
pacity in order to boost expected prots. Anticipating this strategic behaviour, the TSO
supports expected SW by eectively subsidising wind generation by investing heavily in
line 1. This creates an opening for the wind producer at node 2 to benet at the expense
of the conventional producer at node 1. Consequently, the generation investment and
operations observed under perfect competition are altered as a result of the exercise of
market power by the producers and the countervailing decisions of the TSO at the upper
level. For an MI, the strategic withholding by producers at the lower level is likewise
undesirable because it cuts into transmission ows. Recognising this, the MI mitigates
losses to its prot by encouraging transmission. Thus, for dierent reasons than the TSO,
the MI also invests in more distinct lines under Cournot oligopoly than under perfect
competition. However, total transmission capacity drops under the Cournot setting be-
cause of the producers' propensity to withhold generation and the MI's reluctance to
subsidise wind to increase social welfare. Finally, although the MI's actions result in wind
investment at node 3, expected renewable generation, E[RG], is greatest under the TSO.
4.4.4 Example 2: Renewable Portfolio Standards
Given that the EU's 2030 objective is to decrease CO2 emissions by 40% relative to 1990
levels, i.e., implying a deep decarbonisation of the power sector, we run our model with
an RPS target of 80% (Table 4.3). We nd that the eective subsidy for wind (and tax on
conventional generation) enables the high penetration of renewables seen under Cournot
oligopoly in Table 4.2 to be achieved here even under perfect competition. In eect,
RPS mimics the high renewable penetration with alteration of generation patterns under
oligopoly.
4.4.5 Larger Problem Instances
In order to investigate the robustness of our insights, we also implement two additional
examples. For the three-node network with four scenarios and eight time periods, com-
putational times for the CP and TSO market designs are again less than one second.
However, those for the MI market designs balloon to 9 h (with PC) and 35 h (with
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Cournot Oligopoly Perfect Competition CP
MI TSO MI TSO
E[SW] 3549.50 3860.19 4073.66 4154.39 4154.69
E[RG](%) 46.80 87.83 39.65 44.83 44.83
E[arc] 63.72 -4351.73 155.27 20.97 -29.17 P
j2J1
u1;jKarc
1;j 3.70 61.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P
j2J2
u2;jKarc
2;j 6.10 30.50 12.20 24.40 24.40
P
j2J3
u3;jKarc
3;j 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
E[flow1] -3.67 -58.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
E[flow2] 6.10 29.52 12.20 24.05 24.05
E[flow3] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
E[p1] 58.41 36.81 33.58 33.58 33.58
E[p2] 43.31 51.06 31.82 31.84 31.84
E[p3] 48.17 30.48 47.80 35.95 35.95
E[1] -6.76 22.31 0.47 -0.16 -
E[2] -12.29 76.07 -1.30 -1.90 -
E[3] 0.00 44.90 14.69 2.21 -
E[1;1] 1100.45 233.60 188.70 188.70 182.68
E[2;2] 592.09 4672.03 0.00 0.00 56.15
E[3;3] 33.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ginv
1;1 32.91 0.00 61.42 61.42 61.42
ginv
2;2 121.56 356.34 167.94 207.35 207.35
ginv
3;3 12.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CO). Nevertheless, the qualitative insights are similar to those in Example 1. For a six-
node network (Fig. 4.5) with eight candidate transmission lines, computational times
for the CP and TSO market designs are about four minutes, and the results are as for
the three-node network, i.e., transmission lines are built to transfer the wind power to
consumption centres. However, the MI market designs become more challenging to solve
without recourse to decomposition, which is an area for future work.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Deregulation of the power sector has created various market designs to balance competing
economic and social objectives. Here, we take a complementarity approach to compare
MI and TSO market designs in analysing a transition to a more sustainable electricity in-
dustry. By re-formulating the bi-level problems as MPECs and then as MILPs or MIQPs,
we implement these market designs for a three-node example and along with an RPS
requirement. We demonstrate how market design and market power interact to result in
seemingly counterintuitive outcomes. In particular, we note that under the CP and TSO
(with perfect competition) market designs, the results are similar. Intuitively, the conven-
tional producer satises all of the local demand, while a transmission line linking nodes
with wind producers is constructed. This results in generation expansion by the conven-
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Cournot Oligopoly Perfect Competition CP
MI TSO MI TSO
E[SW] 2705.35 3860.18 3084.858 4073.84 4073.84
E[RG](%) 80.10 87.80 80.10 81.57 81.57
E[] 48.85 0.00 49.07 4.09 -
E[arc] 576.93 -4351.73 1010.291 158.68 -39.61 P
j2J1
u1;jKarc
1;j 12.20 61.0 18.30 48.80 48.80
P
j2J2
u2;jKarc
2;j 12.20 30.5 6.10 24.40 24.40
P
j2J3
u3;jKarc
3;j 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
E[flow1] -12.20 -58.44 -18.30 -48.25 -48.25
E[flow2] 8.08 29.524 6.10 23.68 23.68
E[flow3] -3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
E[p1] 79.80 36.80 72.83 36.85 36.85
E[p2] 40.94 51.06 22.44 31.26 31.26
E[p3] 47.48 30.47 49.89 36.33 36.33
E[1] -10.48 11.94 -9.698 2.80 -
E[2] 3.50 11.65 0.076 0.00 -
E[3] -0.32 13.44 0.00 2.50 -
E[1;1] 286.29 233.60 188.70 188.70 243.42
E[2;2] 844.81 4672.02 0.00 0.00 143.57
E[3;3] 33.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ginv
1;1 0.51 0.00 5.38 9.90 9.90
ginv
2;2 164.49 356.34 239.84 368.89 368.89
ginv
3;3 18.09 0.00 8.897 0.00 0.00
tional producer and the cheaper (on-shore) wind producer, and power ows towards the
location of the more expensive (o-shore) wind producer. The MI market design under
perfect competition is qualitatively similar in terms of transmission investment, genera-
tion expansion, and power ows. However, since the MI is concerned about maximising its
own expected prot only, it strategically invests in less transmission capacity to increase
congestion rents, thereby earning positive expected prot. The expected generation from
renewables is similar to that under the CP and TSO (with perfect competition) market
designs.
Allowing for market power at the lower level leads to less generation investment as
producers seek to drive up the market-clearing price. Under the TSO market design with
a Cournot oligopoly, the conventional producer's act of withholding investment, indeed,
increases its own expected prot and average prices across the network. However, this
withholding could have a deleterious eect on social welfare, which the TSO seeks to
mitigate by eectively subsidising more transmission investment along lines involving the
on-shore wind producer. Consequently, this countervailing action by the TSO creates
an opening for the on-shore wind producer to expand generation capacity in order to
oset some of the eects of the market power exercised by the conventional producer.
Somewhat counterintuitively, expected generation from renewables increases signicantly
with a Cournot oligopoly vis- a-vis perfect competition, and the on-shore wind producer
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actually exports power to the conventional producer's node.
This rather surprising result is also encountered in the MI market design with a
Cournot oligopoly but for dierent reasons. As with the TSO, the lower level now has
producers with the incentives to withhold generation capacity in order to increase ex-
pected prots and prices. However, such behaviour will conict with the MI's objective
to maximise expected prot, which consists of the product of congestion rents and power
ows. Since the latter are adversely aected by the producers' withholding, the MI takes
countermeasures to prevent power ows from dropping too much. Thus, it also invests in
lines connecting the on-shore wind producer with the rest of the network, albeit by much
less than the TSO. This enables power generation by not only the on-shore wind pro-
ducer but also the more expensive o-shore wind producer. With an RPS constraint, the
enhanced role for wind producers supported by complementary transmission investment
is observed even when the lower level does not have producers behaving  a la Cournot.
Hence, the desirable policy target of signicant renewable penetration may be attained
(even in the presence of conicting game-theoretic incentives) without the need to tolerate
market power.
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Summary and Conclusions
In the next 25 years, energy demand is projected to grow by 1.5% annually, amounting
to a 50% expansion compared to today's demand levels (EIA, 2013). While estimates
might dier, there is unanimous agreement that the energy use will increase dramatically
over the coming years. Hence, in order to meet future energy demands, wide-ranging
investments and technological developments will be required.
Since the 1990s, to encourage more ecient electricity generation, a number of coun-
tries have undertaken steps to increase competition in their electricity industry. The main
driving force behind the deregulation has been to lower electricity prices and to spur tech-
nological innovation. The more competition, the more likely the electricity prices are to
reach the limits set by the fuel costs. However, due to exercise of market power by power
companies in lightly regulated industries, deregulation has not achieved this goal yet. At
the same time, deregulation has led to higher price uncertainties. Another factor playing
an important role in the energy industry is the need to reduce CO2 emissions to mitigate
the eects of climate change. Emissions from power stations using fossil fuels account for
approximately 30% of the total greenhouse gas emissions in the EU (WRI, 2008). Thus,
improving the energy eciency of fossil-red power plants is one of the keys to reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Parry et al. (1999) argue that the most ecient solution would
be to price the negative externalities of coal- and gas-red generation eectively, i.e.,
to introduce taxes on emissions. However, such policies have garnered limited political
support (Borenstein, 2011). Hence, many governments have preferred to create policies
to promote renewable electricity generation more directly, i.e., by introducing subsidies.
This has led to a large increase in intermittent generation in the EU, which means that
unpredictable weather conditions play an ever-increasing role in electricity generation,
and, hence, in determining electricity prices. Therefore, to counter the eects of uncer-
tain energy prices triggered by deregulation and increased intermittent generation, large
consumers need to apply risk management to energy procurement.
These two factors have also aected generation and transmission investments. TSOs
need to invest in new lines in order to integrate new wind generation, but in a deregulated
95industry they do not have the means to recoup their capital costs directly or to control
generation investment decisions.
The objective of this thesis has been to address these two problems, viz., the risk
management of a microgrid with physical and nancial hedges and transmission expan-
sion with concurrent wind energy investments. Chapter 2 focused on the investment
decision of a large consumer and showed that, for consumers facing electricity and heat
demand, CHP can be eciently used not only to decrease the running costs but also to
hedge against price jumps. In order to provide deeper insights into risk management and
operational exibility, Chapter 3 proceeded with the medium-term management problem
of a microgrid with installed CHP. It was found that CHP as a physical hedge is more
ecient in reducing the microgrid's risk exposure than the available nancial products.
Finally, in Chapter 4, the joint problem of wind energy investment and transmission ex-
pansion was considered, along with an examination of the role that market designs and
the producers' market power can play in accommodating transmission expansion and in-
vestments in wind energy. We nd that it is in the interest of both the TSO and the MI,
albeit for dierent reasons, to mitigate the restrictive behaviour of the incumbent producer
in a Cournot oligopoly, which can support policies towards prot-oriented transmission
expansion.
5.1 Optimal Selection of Distributed Energy Resources
under Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2012), an additional 40
GW of CHP generation capacity, i.e., an increase of around 50% from the current level,
would save 293 TWh of energy, reduce CO2 emissions by 150 million tons, and result in
savings of around $10 billion for consumers per year. In line with these ndings, a num-
ber of countries are aiming to accelerate investment in CHP. In Germany, over the last
twelve years, the government has removed barriers and introduced subsidies to promote
CHP development. Despite these eorts, however, customers' adoption of cogeneration is
lagging behind the targets. The European Association for the Promotion of Cogeneration
(European Cogeneration Review - Germany, 2013) argues that the main reasons behind
the low adoption rate are the volatile gas spark spreads and risk aversion among the
smaller potential investors.
To provide investment decision support, we develop a mean-risk optimisation model
for the long-term risk management problem of a hypothetical microgrid using mixed-
integer, multi-stage stochastic programming. We nd that investing in CHP reduces the
expected energy costs of a microgrid signicantly compared to purchasing electricity from
the market or generating without heat recovery. More important, with an adequate risk
96management strategy, on-site generation can lead to a lower risk exposure compared to
purchasing electricity from the spot market. Due to its high eciency, CHP facilitates
risk management even when the expected gas spark spread is negative. As CHP can swap
electricity with high volatility for gas with low volatility, investing in CHP is somewhat
similar to purchasing a swaption, an option to exchange the streams of payments with
dierent volatilities. Thus, CHP can be regarded as a physical hedge, and, consequently,
it also interacts with nancial hedges. In particular, we nd that electricity futures and
on-site generation are substitutes, while gas futures and on-site generation are comple-
ments. Nevertheless, the degree of both substitution and complementary eects depends
on the level of risk aversion. We note that, with higher electricity price volatility, the
value of on-site generation as a physical hedge increases as compared to nancial hedges.
On the other hand, under lower levels of electricity and gas price correlations, on-site
generation works less eciently as a physical hedge, but the complementary eect of the
gas futures increases. Accordingly, improving the liquidity of the gas futures market can
contribute to better customer adoption of the DG.
As an analysis focusing on the long-term decisions, this work is limited by some sim-
plications that enabled the investment problem to be computationally feasible. Since
the quarterly average spot prices have a lower volatility than the hourly spot prices, using
them underestimates the CVaR-reducing impact of the CHP. Furthermore, while yearly
futures are available, consumers can also purchase weekly and monthly electricity futures
for the base load, peak load, and o-peak load periods as well as monthly gas futures, a
fact that increases the CVaR-reducing potential of nancial hedging. Besides improving
the granularity of the decision making, as a next step, we would also like to investigate
path-dependent investment decisions, which could shed light on the use of real options
in risk management (Wang and Neufville, 2004). Another direction for future work is
to examine the same problem using the linear decision rule approach which, unlike sce-
nario tree-based approximations, provides scalable optimisation models (Rocha and Kuhn,
2012).
5.2 Optimal Operation of Combined Heat and Power
under Uncertainty and Risk Aversion
In addition to examining the long-term investment decisions, large consumers also need
to take into account operational decisions when considering the risk management of a mi-
crogrid. For this reason, the focus of this study is on the optimal operation of a microgrid
with installed CHP in the medium term. We present a multi-stage stochastic mean-risk
optimisation model, which can be used to reduce the risk exposure of a microgrid through
on-site generation and electricity and gas futures purchases. We examine a one-month
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all the available nancial products from the EEX Phelix Futures market. The microgrid
can purchase monthly electricity futures with an o-peak load, a peak load, or a base
load prole, as well as weekly electricity futures contracts for the base load and peak load
periods. Furthermore, the microgrid, with an installed CHP unit, can generate electricity
using gas from the spot and monthly futures markets, while recovering the waste heat.
To supply additional heat, the microgrid can produce heat with the boiler unit also, using
gas from the spot and monthly futures markets.
Similarly, as in the long-term management problem, we nd that a microgrid with
CHP can lower its running costs signicantly and reduce its risk exposure as well. Com-
paring on-site generation with heat recovery and that without it, we nd that an installed
MT unit can lower the operational costs of the microgrid but to a much smaller extent
than a CHP unit. Furthermore, while operating an MT unit reduces the CVaR in absolute
terms due to the lower running costs, it increases the CVaR of the microgrid relative to
its expected cost. In contrast to on-site generation without heat recovery, using a CHP
unit reduces the CVaR by a wider margin both in absolute and relative terms and results
in a preferential distribution of the relative standard deviation of operational costs. Thus,
while results of the dissertation's investment model assert that a MT with and without
heat recovery can function as a physical hedge, we nd that from a medium-term perspec-
tive only a CHP can take this role. By implementing dierent types of futures contracts,
we also gain a better understanding into interactions of physical and nancial hedges. In
particular, with increased risk aversion, the substitution eect of on-site generation with
CHP for monthly base load futures decreases. Such interactions can be exploited only
through sophisticated decision support systems that can enable consumers to decide on
their optimal hedging levels. Advanced microgrids are capable of integrating multiple
DERs, e.g, wind and solar power, and energy storage as well, and may even sell electricity
to the grid. Exploring operational risk management in such microgrids is worthy of a
future study (Lasseter, 2011; Lidula and Rajapakse, 2011).
5.3 Transmission and Wind Investment in a Deregu-
lated Electricity Industry
In the EU, annual investments in wind power have increased from around 3.2 GW in 2000
to 11.2 GW in 2013, with a total installed capacity of 117.3 GW (Wind Energy report,
2014). Since wind power is inherently variable and uncertain due to weather factors, the
continuously increasing wind power capacity negatively aects transmission networks. In
fact, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E)
has identied 100 bottlenecks in its network development plan (European Transmission
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only do such bottlenecks result in high electricity prices but also they can lead to black-
outs. In fact, most of the major blackouts in the US over the last 35 years have been
linked more to transmission problems than to generation (L ev^ eque, 2006).
Thus, maintaining a reliable power supply necessitates investments in both national
and cross-border electricity transmission. In the EU, the total investment requirement
for the high-voltage grid is estimated to be between e68-104 billion (European Climate
Foundation, 2012; von Hirschhausen et al., 2014; Egerer et al. 2013). In addition to im-
posing such huge nancial burdens, the transmission expansion projects are also known
to be intriguingly complex. First, transmission planning needs to consider both short-
term dispatch eciency and long-term incentives for generation investment. Second, in
the context of a deregulated electricity industry, the incumbent and future generators,
or retail companies, all have conicting interests and might try to inuence the relevant
decision makers (L ev^ eque, 2006). While some generators will argue for more transmission
to gain access to new markets, others will argue against transmission expansion to keep
local prices high and maintain their market power. From the perspective of the retail
companies, more transmission results in lower costs and weakened market power for the
incumbent producers.
In order to gain insight into the transmission expansion problem, generation invest-
ments need to be considered concurrently. We develop a stochastic bi-level programming
model that, depending on the market design, has either an MI or a TSO making trans-
mission investment decisions at the upper level, and power producers - both wind and
conventional - determining generation investment and operations at the lower level. First,
these problems are formulated as MPECs, and then, by re-formulating them as MILPs
or MIQPs, we solve them for a three-node example. To provide policy insights into the
increasing renewable generation, we include also the RPS requirement. The interaction of
market design and market power, i.e., either perfect competition or Cournot oligopoly, is
examined. We nd that, in a perfectly competitive market, wind producers are limited by
the incumbent conventional producers, regardless of whether it is the TSO or the MI that
makes the transmission expansion. In contrast, somewhat counterintuitively, oligopolis-
tic behaviour by the producers creates an opening for the wind producers because of
withholding by the incumbent producer. To mitigate the decreased SW under Cournot
oligopoly, the TSO needs to build more lines than under perfect competition and has
to subsidise electricity transmission eectively. Correspondingly, the MI builds a lower
transmission capacity but more lines to increase the transmission ows in an attempt to
maximise its expected prots. Thus, for distinctly dierent reasons, greater renewable
penetration is observed than under perfect competition. However, with an RPS policy,
greater renewable penetration can be achieved even under perfect competition.
Although this study reects the salient features of the power sector, such as the strate-
99gic behaviour, loop ows, and variable, non-dispatchable wind output under dierent
market designs, it may be enhanced further. Possible pathways for extension are imple-
mentation of the models on more realistic test networks, a larger number of scenarios
for the wind output and a bi-level representation of the producers' behaviour, which will
necessitate recourse to decomposition algorithms. Furthermore, in this study we assume
that the lower-level decisions of the producers are open loop, in order to have only one
strategic decision maker at the upper level. Relaxing this supposition to have a closed-
loop problem for some producers would lead to an equilibrium problem with equilibrium
constraints (EPEC). Finally, including risk-constrained investment strategies in our model
might provide better understanding of transmission expansion decisions. These additional
model implementations can serve as topics for further research, which could build on the
ndings presented here.
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